The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion

Kamp, Karl-Heinz

doi:10.2307/1148961

Cited by 17 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…Also George Kennan and Paul Nitze, two foreign policy giants of the Cold War categorized by Gardner (2013, p.41) as 'alternative realists', opposed NATO expansion (Kennan, 1997;Nitze, 1998). Their arguments were echoed by Western academics of whom most of them would define themselves as realists (Brown, 1995;Kamp, 1995;Kupchan and Kupchan, 1995;Mandelbaum, 1995).…”

Section: Nato Expansion and The Balkan Warsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Origins of the Ukraine Crisis and the Need for Collective Security between Russia and the West

Sauer

2016

Global Policy

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The relationship between major powers in the world determines the level of global stability. Two constellations are imaginable: balance of power and collective security. The end of major (world or cold) wars offers possibilities for change from one constellation to another. This article tries to explain the origins of the Ukraine crisis. It posits that the crisis in Ukraine is only a symptom of a wider conflict between two major powers (or power blocs), whose origins can only be understood by assessing the post-Cold War security architecture in Europe. Instead of having integrated Russia in a collective security organization on an equal level, the West kept NATO alive and by doing so deteriorated the relationship with Russia. Despite different warnings from Moscow, NATO invited Ukraine to become member, and the EU offered Trade and Association Agreement talks to Ukraine. As a result, the relationship glided back towards a classic balance of power relation with spheres of influences. To prevent similar conflicts in the future, Russia should be integrated into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Ideally, the existing collective defence organization (NATO) should be transformed into a collective security organization with the inclusion of both Russia and Ukraine. Policy Implications• The way how the 'losers' of a (cold) war are treated determines the stability in the aftermath. The international community did well after 1815 and 1945, but failed miserably after 1918. The argument of this article is that also after 1989 the West missed an opportunity to integrate Russia into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture (on an equal basis). The end of (cold) wars are perfect times for trying to move from one great power constellation to another (e.g. from pure balance of power to collective security).• Collective defence organizations (= alliances) are inherently unstable as they are constantly looking for an external enemy. This article argues that NATO's prolonged life after the Cold War is not normal, and contributed to the crisis with Russia (by extending NATO to the East, incl. plans to include Georgia and Ukraine). Collective security organizations (like the UN) are more stable.

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Section: Nato Expansion and The Balkan Warsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Origins of the Ukraine Crisis and the Need for Collective Security between Russia and the West

Sauer

2016

Global Policy

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“…“In an anarchic world, [Russia and the United States] have little choice but to compete with the other, lest one fall behind and become vulnerable to the other’s predations” (Walt 2018 ). Several scholars argue that this competition between Russia and the United States has played out since the breakup of the Soviet Union (see: Kamp 1995 ; Mandelbaum 1999 ; Pushkov 1997 ; Charap and Colton 2017 ; Mearsheimer 2014 ).…”

Section: Russia the Realistmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Despite initial agreements not to expand NATO to the east, and Russian initial desires under Vladimir Putin to join the EU and/or NATO, the EU and NATO have both denied Putin’s requests and moved eastward at a clip of nearly two countries per year until 2010. The concerns about NATO expansion by foreign policy specialists is well documented (McGwire 1998), and scholarly criticism of expansion is well argued (Kamp 1995 ; Mandelbaum 1999 ; Pushkov 1997 ). George Kennan (Friedman 1998 ), a primary author of the U.S.’s policy of containment which began in 1947 and adviser present at the formation of NATO, called NATO expansion in the 1990s’, “The beginning of a new cold war,” believing that Russia would slowly react “adversely.” More recently, scholars have described the eastward expansion of NATO and U.S. foreign policy as provocations, leading to Russia’s post-2007 realist-like foreign affairs (Charap and Colton 2017 ; Mearsheimer 2014 ).…”

Section: Russia the Realistmentioning

confidence: 99%

Testing the world order: strategic realism in Russian foreign affairs

Feinstein

Pirro

2021

Int Polit

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Russian actions since 2007 appear increasingly to constitute a realist approach to international affairs. Russia appears to be behaving as a rising power, attempting to become a regional or global superpower. Essential to this pursuit, a state must gather information strategically. We examine one feature of strategic information gathering, called a test, a state action that asserts power but also garners information as it elicits a global response. Through a test framework, we provide a realist explanation to understanding Russia’s foreign affairs and its pursuit of power in the near abroad, Western Europe, Middle East, Asia, and foreign elections.

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“…The order in which new members were added to NATO was clearly not random. Instead, as Kamp (1995) summarizes, the sequence was a rational cost-benefit calculation by existing members with respect to whether NATO could function effectively as a military alliance once it expanded to include Eastern European countries in the fourth round. The specific concern among the original NATO members was that Eastern European states would prove to be unreliable allies both in their capabilities and their commitment to NATO's mission.…”

Section: Theory: the Role Of Reputation In Building Alliance Portfoliosmentioning

confidence: 99%

International reputation and alliance portfolios: How unreliability affects the structure and composition of alliance treaties

Narang

LeVeck

2019

Journal of Peace Research

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Why do states ever form military alliances with unreliable partners? States sign offensive and defensive military alliances to increase their fighting capabilities in the event of war and as a signal to deter potential aggressors from initiating a crisis. Yet, signing an alliance with an unreliable partner is at odds with both of these rationales. This should be particularly concerning for peace scholars and policymakers, since the uncertainty generated by unreliable partners may increase system-wide conflict. This article provides an answer to this puzzle by arguing that states continue to form alliances with unreliable partners because they can adopt rational portfolio-diversification strategies. Drawing on well-developed models from portfolio theory, we present evidence that states design their overall alliance portfolios to minimize the risks posed by allies with a reputation for being unreliable. Specifically, we show that unreliable allies are more likely to be pooled into multilateral alliances that dilute risk rather than bilateral alliances, and that states allied with unreliable partners form a greater number of alliances to hedge against the added risk of default. Together, our results demonstrate why unreliable partners may not lead to increased conflict initiation, while also providing a novel explanation for previously unexplained variation in the structure of alliance portfolios. The article contributes to the literatures on international reputation and the rational design of international institutions by demonstrating how international reputation matters in subtle and often overlooked ways.

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The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion

Cited by 17 publications

References 0 publications

The Origins of the Ukraine Crisis and the Need for Collective Security between Russia and the West

The Origins of the Ukraine Crisis and the Need for Collective Security between Russia and the West

Testing the world order: strategic realism in Russian foreign affairs

International reputation and alliance portfolios: How unreliability affects the structure and composition of alliance treaties

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