The Folk Concept of Intentional Action

Cova, Florián

doi:10.1002/9781118661666.ch8

Cited by 26 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 81 publications

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“…As already stated, we cannot speculate in this paper about why one can consistently observe in the two conditions (positive and negative side effects) both an asymmetry of intentionality-ascriptions and an asymmetry of blame/praise-ascriptions. Although we did find that the two asymmetries were correlated, it is important to be cautious in interpreting this correlation (see Cova 2015). On the one hand, the correlation is consistent with Knobe's original conjecture that the asymmetry of intention-ascriptions is driven by the asymmetry of blameworthiness/praiseworthiness ascriptions.…”

Section: Fundingsupporting

confidence: 74%

“…But we take notice of criticisms of Knobe's original hypothesis and recognize that the psychological mechanisms underpinning the Knobe Effect remain a topic of considerable controversy. We also allow for the possibility that the correlation as in (3) only obtains in some cases but not in others (see Cova 2015). Therefore, we do not take a stand on the fourth claim in Knobe's original hypothesis: (4) that the asymmetry of blame/praise-ascriptions as in (2) explains the asymmetry of intention-ascriptions as in (1).…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In order to do this, we drew upon the so-called "Knobe Effect": Knobe (2003) found that the positiveness or negativeness 2 of sideeffects of actions influences people's assessment of whether those side-effects were brought about intentionally, and also that people are more willing to assign blame for negative side-effects of actions than they are to assign praise for positive side-effect of actions (see also Nadelhoffer 2005Nadelhoffer , 2006Knobe 2006;Nichols and Ulatowski 2007;Malle 2010;Cova 2015). Building upon this body of research, we aimed to answer the question whether a "Group Knobe Effect" (GKE) also obtains, i.e.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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“The Group Knobe Effect”: evidence that people intuitively attribute agency and responsibility to groups

Michael

Szigeti

2018

Philosophical Explorations

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In the current paper, we present and discuss a series of experiments in which we investigated people's willingness to ascribe intentions, as well as blame and praise, to groups. The experiments draw upon the so-called "Knobe Effect". Knobe [2003. "Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language." Analysis 63: [190][191][192][193][194] found that the positiveness or negativeness of side-effects of actions influences people's assessment of whether those side-effects were brought about intentionally, and also that people are more willing to assign blame for negative side-effects of actions than they are to assign praise for positive side-effect of actions. Building upon this research, we found evidence that the positiveness or negativeness of side-effects of group actions influences people's willingness to attribute intentions to groups (Experiment 1a), and that people are more willing to assign blame to groups for negative side-effects of actions than they are to assign praise to groups for positive side-effects of actions (Experiment 1b). We also found evidence (Experiments 2a, 2b, 3 and 4) that the "Group Knobe Effect" persists even when intentions and blame/ praise are attributed to groups non-distributively, indicating that people tend not to think of group intentions and group blame/praise in distributive terms. We conclude that the folk are collectivist about group intentions, and also about the blameworthiness and praiseworthiness of groups.

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Section: Fundingsupporting

confidence: 74%

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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“The Group Knobe Effect”: evidence that people intuitively attribute agency and responsibility to groups

Michael

Szigeti

2018

Philosophical Explorations

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“…Knobe also found that there is an asymmetry to such judgments: "people seem considerably more willing to say that a side-effect [of an agent's intended action] was brought about intentionally when they regard that side-effect as bad than when they regard it as good". 1 These survey results have since been replicated many times and the asymmetry has become known as "the Knobe effect" (for references, see, e.g., Knobe 2010;Cova 2016). The results suggest, first, that people at least implicitly reject the Simple View, since there are cases where unintended but foreseen side effects of an intended action are seen as intentional.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 94%

“…How come? One common way of interpreting this result is that it shows how the agent's attitudes towards the side effect influence intentionality ratings (see Cova 2016). This is usually expressed by saying that an element of regret is introduced.…”

Section: Knobe's Vignettes As Accounts Of Action Sequencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Experimental Philosophy, Ethnomethodology, and Intentional Action: A Textual Analysis of the Knobe Effect

Lymer

Blomberg

2019

Hum Stud

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In "Intentional action and side-effects in ordinary language" (2003), Joshua Knobe reported an asymmetry in test subjects' responses to a question about intentionality: subjects are more likely to judge that a side effect of an agent's intended action is intentional if they think the side effect is morally bad than if they think it is morally good. This result has been taken to suggest that the concept of intentionality is an inherently moral concept. In this paper, we draw attention to the fact that Knobe's original interpretation of the results is based on an abstract rendering of the central scenario (the Chairman scenario) that is significantly different from the vignettes presented to the survey participants. In particular, the experimental vignettes involve temporal and social dimensions; they portray sequences of social actions involving an agent and an interlocutor, rather than a lone agent making a momentary decision in light of certain attitudes. Through textual analyses of a set of vignettes used to study the Knobe effect, drawing on ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, and discursive psychology, we show that there are many differences between the experimental conditions besides the moral valence of the side effect. In light of our textual analyses, we discuss vignette methodology in experimental philosophy and suggest an alternative interpretation of Knobe's original experimental results. We also argue that experimental philosophy could benefit from considering research on naturally occurring social interaction as an alternative source of empirical findings for discussions of folk-psychological concepts.

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Evaluative Effects on Knowledge Attributions

Beebe¹

2016

A Companion to Experimental Philosophy

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Experimental philosophers have investigated various ways in which non-epistemic evaluations can affect knowledge attributions. For example, several teams of researchers (Beebe and Buckwalter 2010;Beebe and Jensen 2012; Schaffer and Knobe 2012;Beebe and Shea 2013;Buckwalter 2014b;Turri 2014) report that the goodness or badness of an agent's action can affect whether the agent is taken to have certain kinds of knowledge. These findings raise important questions about how patterns of folk knowledge attributions should influence philosophical theorizing about knowledge.The contemporary starting point for philosophical discussions of the nature of knowledge is the justified true belief (or JTB) model. According to this traditional perspective, in order to know something, for example, that water is H 2 O, it must be true that water is H 2 O. This requirement of truth (also known as factivity) specifies that, no matter how firmly you might believe something or how strong your reasons for believing it might be, if it is not true, you cannot know it. In addition to truth, there are also requirements regarding belief and justification. If it is true that water is H 2 O, but you have no reason for thinking that it is, you cannot be said to know it. Even if you could bring yourself to believe that water is H 2 O without having any reason for thinking that it is, and it turned out that your belief was correct, this would not be enough for knowledge. Lucky guesses do not count as knowledge. Furthermore, even if you had reason for thinking that water is H 2 O and if the truth requirement were satisfied, if you did not in fact believe that water is H 2 O, it would not be true that you know that water is H 2 O. Thus, according to the JTB model, each of the justification, truth, and belief conditions is necessary for knowledge, and together they are sufficient.As is well known, the JTB model first came under significant philosophical attack by Edmund Gettier (1963), who used cleverly crafted thought experiments to argue that justification, truth, and belief are not in fact sufficient for knowledge. 2 More recently, mainstream and experimental philosophers have begun to question whether the various components of the JTB model are even necessary. Allan Hazlett (2010Hazlett ( , 2012, for example, has suggested that knowledge without truth

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The Folk Concept of Intentional Action

Cited by 26 publications

References 81 publications

“The Group Knobe Effect”: evidence that people intuitively attribute agency and responsibility to groups

“The Group Knobe Effect”: evidence that people intuitively attribute agency and responsibility to groups

Experimental Philosophy, Ethnomethodology, and Intentional Action: A Textual Analysis of the Knobe Effect

Evaluative Effects on Knowledge Attributions

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