The fleeting gleam of praise: Cognitive processes underlying behavioral reactions to self-relevant feedback.

Abstract

We propose that a preference for favorable social feedback (i.e., selfenhancement) requires only that feedback be characterized as favorable or unfavorable but that a preference for self-confirming feedback (i.e., selfverification) is based on a more elaborate set of cognitive operations that requires both the characterization of feedback and a subsequent comparison of that feedback to a representation of self stored in memory. Study 1 set the stage for testing this hypothesis by showing that depriving people of processing resources interfered with their tendency to access their self-conceptions. In Studies 2 and 3, participants who were deprived of resources preferred the favorable, self-enhancing evaluator, whereas control participants displayed a preference for the self-verifying evaluator, even if that evaluator was relatively unfavorable.

Heart and Mind in Conflict: the Interplay of Affect and Cognition in Consumer Decision Making

“…Before respondents proceeded toward the cart and to the second room, the processing-resources manipulation was carried out by adopting a procedure that has been widely used in the literature (see, e.g., Gilbert et al 1988;Gilbert, Giesler, and Morris 1995;Swann et al 1990;Trope and Alfieri 1997). One group of respondents (low processingresources condition) was requested to memorize a sevendigit number; another group (high processing-resources condition) was requested to memorize a two-digit number.…”

Is identityper seirrelevant? A contrarian view of self-verification effects

“…Third, the evidence consists, not only of predicted main effects, but also of predicted moderator effects. [14] This means that any rival theory has more explanatory work to do. Finally, the evidence consists of several findings that reliably replicate [4,15] ).…”

“…[14] Quite simply, time pressure imposes a cognitive load that disables the explicit cognitive processes required to differentiate truth from falsity, but it leaves intact the implicit cognitive processes required to differentiate positivity from negativity, (see [42] for a general cognitive model). Hence, people with negative self-views spontaneously seek the ''nice'' evaluator but spurn the ''nasty'' one: any gloomy reflections about their rational entitlements and obligations are nipped in the cognitive bud.…”

“…In particular, when people with negative self-views make a snap judgment as to whether to interact with an evaluator who views them either favorably or unfavorably, they more often opt to interact with the former. Only when they have ample time for reflection do they more often opt to interact with the latter ( [14] : Experiment 3). In addition, when under time pressure, people with negative self-views report being keener to interact with an evaluator who views them favorably than one who views them unfavorably; this effect is attenuated, as usual, only in the absence of time pressure [14] : Experiment 2; see also [22] : Experiment 4).…”

“…Only when they have ample time for reflection do they more often opt to interact with the latter ( [14] : Experiment 3). In addition, when under time pressure, people with negative self-views report being keener to interact with an evaluator who views them favorably than one who views them unfavorably; this effect is attenuated, as usual, only in the absence of time pressure [14] : Experiment 2; see also [22] : Experiment 4). The standard interpretation of these findings is that self-verification strivings, unlike self-enhancement strivings, are mediated by relatively sophisticated cognitive operations (i.e., involving the comparison of feedback content with self-representations).…”