The (Financial) Ties That Bind: Social Networks of Intraparty Caucuses

Abstract

Intraparty caucuses in the US Congress are often recognized for the information sharing, voting blocs, and personal relationships they facilitate. This article introduces an additional benefit to joining intraparty caucuses: campaign donations. Applying social network analysis and exponential random graph models to the 115th and 116th Congresses, I find that members are more likely to donate to their fellow caucus members than other members in Congress. In addition, I find that party leaders, particularly Republican party leaders, are less likely to donate to members that join intraparty caucuses, indicating that Leadership PAC funding is strategic for rank‐and‐file members and party leaders alike. This article adds to our understanding of intraparty caucuses, particularly their role in facilitating member‐to‐member campaign donations, and the relationship between caucus members and party leaders.