2014
DOI: 10.1093/publius/pjt064
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The Federalism of Fracking: How the Locus of Policy-Making Authority Affects Civic Engagement

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Cited by 44 publications
(15 citation statements)
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“…The system of UOGE governance in the United States is distinctly polycentric (Arnold & Holahan, ; Warner & Shapiro, ). Since the national congress has declined to “federalize” UOGE regulation, and since USEPA—partly due to restrictions in existing federal statutes (Rabe & Borick, )—has adopted the role of secondary overseer, states have assumed primary regulatory authority over UOGE.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The system of UOGE governance in the United States is distinctly polycentric (Arnold & Holahan, ; Warner & Shapiro, ). Since the national congress has declined to “federalize” UOGE regulation, and since USEPA—partly due to restrictions in existing federal statutes (Rabe & Borick, )—has adopted the role of secondary overseer, states have assumed primary regulatory authority over UOGE.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Local governments across Pennsylvania vary appreciably in their inclinations and abilities to regulate UOGE (Arnold & Holahan, 2014). Favoring state-level controlwith the intention of minimizing the formidable coordination problems posed by the fact that Pennsylvania's shale fairways contain hundreds of self-governing local government units that each control land use within their borders, subject to state planning and zoning laws-parts of Act 13 explicitly preempted or constrained some aspects of local self-governance.…”
Section: Polycentricity-mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Still, it can be assumed that 'early adopters' of the fracking technology (such as Texas) serve as important sites for regulatory experimentation and as "Guinea pigs" 'laggards' can profit from. 5 Latecomers, in turn, may profit from a process of policy learning, either adopting best practice or going a different pathway in order to avoid failures the first movers had encountered. Finally, a federalist stance on fracking would pose that regulatory competition among U.S. states would eventually generate a set of regulatory patterns that are widely regarded as superior to others and hence diffused both horizontally and vertically across the country.…”
Section: Regulatory Competition and Experimentationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To the contrary, strong regulatory heterogeneity created a 'hodgepodge' [151], 385) of regulatory frameworks in shale on the state level ( [126] cited in Rabe [121]). So while regulatory competition may on the one hand lead to tailored results for a specific statelevel environment (possibly also contingent on other factors such as state capacity [5] or the ability to compromise [40]), it on the other hand has not generated opportunity for best practice and policy learning. More empirical investigation therefore is warranted, notably beyond the US context, and with a deliberately comparative approach (an exception is Lin [89]).…”
Section: Regulatory Competition and Experimentationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The distribution of fracking's costs and benefits places additional stressors on state-local governing relationships (Arnold and Holahan 2014;McAdam and Boudet 2012;Gold and McGinty 2013). Supporters point to broad and often statewide improvements to economic forecasts, state and local government budgets, and significant gains in employment.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%