The Federalism Debate

Abstract

These papers examine current Australian federalism from the perspectives of an academic and a practitioner. Both acknowledge the opportunities arising from the current White Paper process, as well as challenges in the face of substantial cuts of proposed funding from the Commonwealth to the States. They insist upon the need for renewed commitment to the idea of federalism, and the importance of sustainable fiscal arrangements within the federation. Challenges in Reforming Australian federalism reminds us of the kind of federalism operative in Australia -concurrent, not coordinate -and develops reform proposals accordingly. TenSteps to a Better Federation offers a range of ideas from a former state premier, drawing on his experience as both a participant at Council of Australian Government (COAG) and, later, Chair of the COAG Reform Council.

Separating Sovereignty and Sharing Problems: Australian Federalism and the European Union

“…The first is to give the Australian constitutional grid a degree of policy dynamism in terms of trans‐boundary agenda setting, the flow of different ideas, and the development of shared arrangements for feedback on policy performance; notably the concept allows the insight that these flows do not follow straight, constitutionally prescribed lines of transmission. For example, Brumby and Galligan (: 83) outline the benefits of ‘healthy competition’ between states and instances of policy mobility. Further, the New Zealand government is a formal member of many coordination structures for intergovernmental relations – for example, the COAG Health Council – as is the president of the Australian Local Government Association (ALGA).…”

“…It helps describe the characteristics of the development of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) over 20 years or so into a permanent and standing body for the systematic organisation of intergovernmental relations (Carroll and Head ). Although the core executive of the Commonwealth government exercises substantial influence and control in COAG, consistent with centralisation, for others its arrival and potential future development serves as a counterpoint to immanent centralising tendencies and offers renewed multi‐level collaborative potential in the Australian federation (Kildea and Lynch ; Painter contributions in Brumby and Galligan ; Committee for the Economic Development of Australia (CEDA) ).…”

Multi-level Governance and the Study of Australian Federalism

“…The increasing diversity and unevenness in the economic geography of Australia demands a recovery of the early policy justifications for the Australian federation (Moran 2011;Brumby and Galligan 2015): a laboratory for natural experiments in policy that enhance opportunities for cross-jurisdictional learning through comparison of different approaches to related problems. There are some cases of partial, OMC-type experiments available in the contemporary history of Australian federalism; for example, Parkin (1988) analysed interrelations between, and diversity within, Commonwealth-state housing agreements, where there were compromised but shared goals alongside substantial local discretion in implementation.…”

“…Whilst acknowledging COAG's achievements in policy reform, it remains ad hoc in many important respects and, in the absence of a firm legal or constitutional footing, COAG's operation and its agenda remains at the discretion of the prime minister of the day (Brumby and Galligan 2015;Kildea and Lynch 2010). For example, there has been significant variation in the number of times that COAG has been held, from less than once a year in the early years of John Howard's government to four times a year under former prime minister Kevin Rudd.…”

“…For example, there has been significant variation in the number of times that COAG has been held, from less than once a year in the early years of John Howard's government to four times a year under former prime minister Kevin Rudd. An important related consequence of prime ministerial discretion is that COAG has a tendency to centralise policy control at the expense of diversity, thus losing the advantages of diversity and learning between states (Anderson 2008;Brumby 2009;Brumby and Galligan 2015). Similarly, running through the Senate Committee Report's (2011: 53) agenda for reform of the Australian federation is a stress on 'joint ownership' in negotiations among the Commonwealth and state and territory governments, particularly with the latter having greater input in setting the agenda of COAG.…”