The Fate of Former Authoritarian Elites Under Democracy

Abstract

Why do some former authoritarian elites return to power after democratization through reelection or reappointment to political office, or by assuming board positions in state-owned or major private enterprises, whereas others do not and still others face punishment? This article investigates this question using an original data set on constitutional origins and the fate of the upper echelon of outgoing authoritarian elites across Latin America from 1900 to 2015. I find that authoritarian elites from outgoing regimes that impose a holdover constitution that sticks through democratization are more likely to regain political or economic power—especially through national positions where the potential payoffs are largest—and less likely to face severe or nominal punishment. I also find a positive role for political capital among former elites. These results are robust to alternative explanations of authoritarian elites’ fate and using instrumental variables to address potential endogeneity. The findings have important implications for democratic consolidation and quality.

Lost in Transition? The Persistence of Dictatorship Mayors

“…In contrast to the Indonesian case, in Chile the transition to democracy was less abrupt and consequently appointed mayors -and the elite more generally -had time to prepare for the upcoming democracy . In this regard, our paper contributes to a literature documenting the strategies used by elites to maintain their power (Robinson and Hadiz, 2004;Honna, 2010;Albertus andMenaldo, 2014, 2018;. In addition, by empirically studying the fate of mayors appointed by a dictatorship we also contribute to a literature studying elite persistence (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008;Albertus, 2019).…”

“…In this regard, our paper contributes to a literature documenting the strategies used by elites to maintain their power (Robinson and Hadiz, 2004;Honna, 2010;Albertus andMenaldo, 2014, 2018;. In addition, by empirically studying the fate of mayors appointed by a dictatorship we also contribute to a literature studying elite persistence (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008;Albertus, 2019).…”

Lost in transition? The persistence of dictatorship mayors

“…In contrast to the Indonesian case, in Chile the transition to democracy was less abrupt and consequently appointed mayors -and the elite more generally -had time to prepare for the upcoming democracy . In this regard, our paper contributes to a literature documenting the strategies used by elites to maintain their power (Robinson and Hadiz, 2004;Honna, 2010;Albertus andMenaldo, 2014, 2018;. In addition, by empirically studying the fate of mayors appointed by a dictatorship we also contribute to a literature studying elite persistence (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008;Albertus, 2019).…”

Alternative Legacies of Authoritarianism: Pro-dictator Bias in Ideology

“…This move "toward democracy by undemocratic means" may facilitate peaceful and stable transition (O'Donnell et al 1986;38), but also makes authoritarian inheritance more likely via retaining the old authoritarian constitution, grassroot party organization of the party-state, and the financial resources of the former regime (Loxton and Mainwaring 2018;Albertus and Menaldo 2018;Slater and Wong 2018;Choi 1994). Among 314 former authoritarian elites in Latin America, around 72.6% continued their political career by winning elections or working in the business sector after regime transition (Albertus 2019). Of the sixty-five Third Wave democracies, 72% of them inherited prominent authoritarian successor parties that have gained stable electoral support in democratic elections (Loxton and Mainwaring 2018).…”

“…These satisfied authoritarian citizens might have positive views toward the dictatorship during his reign, responding to his request for political loyalty, and can continue to hold similar sentiment even after the fall of the dictatorship. Especially in countries where strong ruling elites negotiated democratic transition, these former leaders can secure the survival of the party organization, authoritarian political institutions, and even sentiment towards the former regime (Albertus and Menaldo 2018;Albertus 2019;Slater and Wong 2018). This paper investigates this possibility of pro-dictator ideological bias in post-authoritarian democracies by expanding previous studies on anti-dictator bias (Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2020;Frantzeskakis and Sato 2020).…”