The Family, Inheritance, and the Intergenerational Transmission of Inequality

Tomes, Nigel

doi:10.1086/261014

Cited by 240 publications

(121 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Adults, for example, might give to their parents because they care about them and get vicarious satisfaction from giving. Becker (1974) was one of the first to develop a rigorous economic model of altruism's implications; many researchers (for exarmple, Adams 1980, Tomes 1981, Menchik and David 1983 have used Becker's model to analyze bequests in the United States. But the altruism model has received less attention in the literature on developing countries.…”

Section: Motives For Private Transfersmentioning

confidence: 99%

ACHIEVING SOCIAL OBJECTIVES THROUGH PRIVATE TRANSFERS: A Review

Cox¹,

Jiménez²

1990

World Bank Res Obs

138

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Section: Motives For Private Transfersmentioning

confidence: 99%

ACHIEVING SOCIAL OBJECTIVES THROUGH PRIVATE TRANSFERS: A Review

Cox¹,

Jiménez²

1990

World Bank Res Obs

138

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“…4See Andrew Abel (1985), Laurence Kotlikoff et al (1984);and Nigel Tomes (1981). 5See, for example, Stanley Fischer (1973) and Benjamin Friedman and Mark Warshawsky (1984). 6See, for example, Buiter (1979), Buiter and Carmichael (1984), Carmichael (1982), Burbidge (1983Burbidge ( , 1984, and Philippe Weil (1987).…”

Section: A Two-sided Transfer Motivementioning

confidence: 99%

Operative Gift and Bequest Motives

Abel¹

1987

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The Ricerdlon Equivalence Theorem, which is the proposition that changes in the timing of lump-sum taxes have no effect on consumption or capital accumulation, depends on the existence of operative altruistic motives for Intergenerational transfers. These transfers can ha bequests from parents to children or gifts from children to parents. In order for the Ricardlan Equivalence Theorem to hold, one of these transfer motives must he operative In the sense that the level of the transfer Is not determined by a corner solution resulting from a binding non-negativity constraint This paper derives conditions that determine whether the bequest motive will be operative, the gift motive will be operative, or neither motive will he operative In a model in which consumers are altruistic toward their parents end their children.

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“…Multiple consumption goods permit variable labor supply; the wealth effect on labor supply, and thus on earnings, Ž . has been analyzed by Tomes 1981 . That intergenerational transfers are motivated by including some forms of wealth as a direct source of utility Ž .…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Social Mobility: The Barro–Becker Children Meet the Laitner–Loury Dynasties

Álvarez

1999

Review of Economic Dynamics

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The Family, Inheritance, and the Intergenerational Transmission of Inequality

Cited by 240 publications

References 5 publications

ACHIEVING SOCIAL OBJECTIVES THROUGH PRIVATE TRANSFERS: A Review

ACHIEVING SOCIAL OBJECTIVES THROUGH PRIVATE TRANSFERS: A Review

Operative Gift and Bequest Motives

Social Mobility: The Barro–Becker Children Meet the Laitner–Loury Dynasties

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