2004
DOI: 10.1080/01944360408976336
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The Failures of Economic Development Incentives

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Cited by 200 publications
(163 citation statements)
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References 27 publications
(37 reference statements)
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“…These issues clearly make the evaluation of EZ programs a key but intricate empirical matter and explain the relatively abundant and mixed literature on the topic (see Peters and Fisher, 2004, and Hirasuna and Michael, 2005, for recent surveys). The main usual challenge in such evaluations is to address selection issues in the designation of areas and this requires resorting to quasi-experimental techniques using panel data for instance to control for local unobserved heterogeneity as in the present paper.…”
Section: A Brief Survey Of Recent Evaluationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These issues clearly make the evaluation of EZ programs a key but intricate empirical matter and explain the relatively abundant and mixed literature on the topic (see Peters and Fisher, 2004, and Hirasuna and Michael, 2005, for recent surveys). The main usual challenge in such evaluations is to address selection issues in the designation of areas and this requires resorting to quasi-experimental techniques using panel data for instance to control for local unobserved heterogeneity as in the present paper.…”
Section: A Brief Survey Of Recent Evaluationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(1989,214) Given this framing of social problems as economic problems, many social scientists and community organizers would likely accept privatism as an appropriate solution to urban ills if proven effective. Unfortunately, a wealth of literature demonstrates that public subsidy of private development projects in the name of urban economic development have done little, if anything, to help the residents of distressed communities who are promised a great deal at the onset of such partnerships (Peters and Fisher 2004;Barnekov and Rich 1989). Further, Barnekov and Rich concluded that all the fundamental assumptions underlying public-private partnerships are false or greatly exaggerated.…”
Section: Equitable Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Without the ONE DC community benefits agreement attached to the Progression Place project, over $20 million of public money would have been invested with no assurance that neighborhood or city residents would benefit. As the literature suggests, cities continue to pursue private public partnerships in the name of economic development despite evidence that such projects often fail to benefit residents (Barnekov and Rich, 1989;Peters and Fisher, 2004). In the case of Progression Place, the Council of the District of Columbia provided substantial subsidies despite concerns that a development anchored by a nonprofit organization, apartments, and small retail outlets would not be able to quickly generate tax revenue to match the initial investment (Neibauer 2012).…”
Section: A Response To the Tradition Of Privatismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These are all benefits that are not necessarily available to domestic companies or organisations outside of the IDZ. On a cautious note, the role of IDZ's in national development have long been contested (Peters and Fisher, 2004;Wilder and Rubin, 1996) with histories, in various countries, of providing little return (other than much valued employment opportunities) after these many exemptions and services have been made or provided.…”
Section: South African Perspectives On the Prcmentioning
confidence: 99%