The Failure of the Multiverse Hypothesis as a Solution to the Problem of No Best World

Johnson, David Kyle

doi:10.1007/s11841-013-0397-6

Cited by 8 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…8 Even if the multiverse possibility does not help to address the problem of no best world (and I am inclined to agree with Monton that it does not), it may nonetheless help to address the problem of evil if, as I am arguing, the standards of acceptability for a universe are lower in a multiverse scenario than in a single-8. See also Johnson (2014) and Rubio (2020) for similar arguments. universe scenario.…”

Section: The Laxity Of Consequentialist Requirements In Light Of the ...mentioning

confidence: 85%

“…23 If God does create duplicate universes by actualizing some universe plans multiple times, there would seem to be no basis for specifying how many times God would actualize any given live plan. It is natural to postulate that God would actualize every live plan an infinite number of times, but this does not specify the extent of duplication since there are different "sizes" of infinity and there is no highest transfinite cardinal (Monton 2010;Johnson 2014;Rubio 2020). Without any basis 22.…”

Section: From Laxity Of Standards To Skepticismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Skeptical Challenge of the Theistic Multiverse

Pittard

2023

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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The multiverse theodicy says that because God can without cost create an infinite number of universes, the standards of acceptability that a conceivable universe must meet to be worthy of divine creation are significantly laxer than is typically supposed in discussions of the problem of evil. While the prospect of a theistic multiverse arguably helps the theist to explain suffering, I argue that it also poses a serious skeptical worry. Given the alleged laxity of the standards that a universe must meet to be worthy of inclusion in a theistic multiverse, there is reason to think that God would be justified in creating a great many deceptive universes that, while good overall, are inhabited by creatures who are radically mistaken in their beliefs. And these deceptive universes would arguably be no less abundant than the nondeceptive universes. After developing this skeptical challenge, I assess some possible theistic responses. One of the more promising responses I consider argues that in order to secure the great good of true friendship between God and creatures, God has reason to exclude deceptive universes from the multiverse even when those universes have great intrinsic value.

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Section: The Laxity Of Consequentialist Requirements In Light Of the ...mentioning

confidence: 85%

Section: From Laxity Of Standards To Skepticismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Skeptical Challenge of the Theistic Multiverse

Pittard

2023

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…Bradley Monton (2010) presents criticisms of several such standards. David Kyle Johnson (2014) argues that there is no best multiverse. In any case, it is not clear that a morally unsurpassable being would create a world in which She was a Bad Samaritan (violated WSP).…”

Section: The No Best World Defensementioning

confidence: 99%

Bad Samaritans, Aftertastes, and the Problem of Evil

Schlossberger

2014

Philosophia

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“…Isomorphic reasoning motivates the problem of no best world (mentioned in Note 38) and also certain objections to the coherence of theistic multiverses. On the latter, seeKraay (2012) andJohnson (2014).58 Every anti-theistic argument in the literature to date focusses on the putative "downsides" of theism for persons. But of course not all worlds feature persons, and these arguments cannot apply to personless worlds.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Axiology of Theism

Kraay

2021

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Theism is the view that God exists; naturalism is the view that there are no supernatural beings, processes, mechanisms, or forces. This Element explores whether things are better, worse, or neither on theism relative to naturalism. It introduces readers to the central philosophical issues that bear on this question, and it distinguishes a wide range of ways it can be answered. It critically examines four views, three of which hold (in various ways) that things are better on theism than on naturalism, and one of which holds just the opposite.

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The Failure of the Multiverse Hypothesis as a Solution to the Problem of No Best World

Cited by 8 publications

References 32 publications

The Skeptical Challenge of the Theistic Multiverse

The Skeptical Challenge of the Theistic Multiverse

Bad Samaritans, Aftertastes, and the Problem of Evil

The Axiology of Theism

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