The Extended Deterrent Value of Nuclear Weapons

Abstract

Three questions are addressed in this study: (1) Does a nuclear retaliatory capability contribute to extended deterrence against a nonnuclear power? (2) If so, is the deterrent value of nuclear weapons contingent upon the prior credible threat of conventional armed engagement by the defender? (3) Or, is the deterrent impact of nuclear weapons so potent that the conventional balance of forces has little deterrent impact? Competing hypotheses are formulated and then tested by probit analysis. The empirical findings indicate that (a) nuclear weapons do contribute to extended deterrence success, but (b) that effect is not contingent upon the prior threat of conventional armed conflict, and (c) there is an inverse relationship between the conventional balance of forces and the extended deterrent role of nuclear weapons.

Indirect Policing: Its Theory, Mechanism, and Application to Combatting Elusive Perpetrators

“…The Soviet-oriented Sandinistas (FSLN) took power and even supported the left-wing guerrilla organization (FMLN 77 It is apparently too hasty to attribute these regime changes solely to U.S. intervention, but at the same time, it is probably too naïve to deny the U.S. influence in these regions. 78 Proponents and those in favor of deterrence include: Achen and Snidal 1989;Danilovic 2001;Harvey 1995;Harvey 1998;Huth 1988a;Huth 1988b;Huth 1990;Huth and Russett 1984;Huth and Russett 1988;Huth and Russett 1990;Huth and Russett 1993;Lieberman 1994;Signarino and Tarar 2006. countermeasure against them. We hope that our theoretical framework will contribute to the future discussion on how to counteract diversifying threats.…”

Crisis escalation: An empirical test in the context of extended deterrence

“…Some analyses have found little evidence that any relationship exists (Huth and Russett, 1984;Organski and Kugler, 1980), while others claim that nuclear weapons do enter into states' calculations when deciding how to react (Powell, 1989). Huth (1990) reversed the findings of previous studies on extended deterrence and concluded that attackers are more likely to be deterred when paired against nuclear defenders who issue certain types of nuclear threats. It is difficult to interpret the meaning of these contradictory findings especially when different research designs are used to test the hypotheses.…”

The Perils of Predicting Proliferation

“…The exceptions focus on the success rate of extended deterrence and on the effects of nuclear weapons in regional settings. Paul Huth, for example, finds that nuclear weapons increase the likelihood of successful deterrence of attacks on one's allies (Huth 1988(Huth , 1990. S. Paul Kapur combines case-study research and statistical methods in his study of the effects of nuclear weapons in South Asia and finds that nuclear weapons have led to an increase in the likelihood of MIDs between India and Pakistan (Kapur 2007).…”