The expression of trace conditioning during non-REM sleep and its relation to subjective experience

Wamsley, Erin J.; Antrobus, John S.

doi:10.1016/j.nlm.2009.02.012

Cited by 21 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 66 publications

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“…More recent models involve that dreams echo dynamic functions like reactivation and further consolidation of novel and individually-relevant features encountered during previous waking experience (e.g. Cipolli, Fagioli, Mazzetti, & Tuozzi, 2004;Schwartz, 2010;Wamsley & Antrobus, 2009;Wamsley, Perry, Djonlagic, Reaven, & Stickgold, 2010). Such models of dreaming might be consistent with accumulating evidence showing the potential benefit of reprocessing freshly encoded information for long-term storage (Diekelmann & Born, 2010;.…”

Section: Functions Of Dreamingmentioning

confidence: 54%

“…Further supporting a role of sleep in emotional regulation, the consolidation of emotional memories, including conditioned responses, is strengthened by a period of sleep following the emotional experience, particularly for hippocampus-dependent emotional memories (Sterpenich et al, 2007(Sterpenich et al, , 2009Wagner et al, 2001Wagner et al, , 2006Wamsley & Antrobus, 2009). Animal (Silvestri, 2005) and human studies (Pace-Schott et al, 2009) also suggest that the extinction of a conditioned response is affected by sleep, mainly in a hippocampus-independent manner (i.e.…”

Section: Integration Of Brain Imaging and Dream Datamentioning

confidence: 96%

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Cognitive and emotional processes during dreaming: A neuroimaging view

Desseilles

Dang‐Vu

Sterpenich

et al. 2011

Consciousness and Cognition

141

121

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a b s t r a c tDream is a state of consciousness characterized by internally-generated sensory, cognitive and emotional experiences occurring during sleep. Dream reports tend to be particularly abundant, with complex, emotional, and perceptually vivid experiences after awakenings from rapid eye movement (REM) sleep. This is why our current knowledge of the cerebral correlates of dreaming, mainly derives from studies of REM sleep. Neuroimaging results show that REM sleep is characterized by a specific pattern of regional brain activity. We demonstrate that this heterogeneous distribution of brain activity during sleep explains many typical features in dreams. Reciprocally, specific dream characteristics suggest the activation of selective brain regions during sleep. Such an integration of neuroimaging data of human sleep, mental imagery, and the content of dreams is critical for current models of dreaming; it also provides neurobiological support for an implication of sleep and dreaming in some important functions such as emotional regulation.

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Section: Functions Of Dreamingmentioning

confidence: 54%

Section: Integration Of Brain Imaging and Dream Datamentioning

confidence: 96%

Cognitive and emotional processes during dreaming: A neuroimaging view

Desseilles

Dang‐Vu

Sterpenich

et al. 2011

Consciousness and Cognition

141

121

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…There are certainly phenomenological differences in reports following awakenings from REM sleep, which often result in elaborate narratives including complex multimodal imagery and intense emotions, and often less vivid and more thought-like reports from NREM sleep (Hobson et al, 2000; 799–803; Wamsley and Antrobus, 2009; for a comprehensive discussion see Windt, 2014, chapter 2); and there is clearly complex cognitive phenomenology during sleep as well (which also includes volitional components, Dresler et al, 2013); but as the frequency of lucidity (Metzinger, 2003a; Noreika et al, 2010; Voss et al, 2013) is generally so low as to be negligible for the present discussion, conscious thought during sleep can be treated as lacking M-autonomy almost entirely. Adults spend approximately 1.5–2 h per night in REM sleep (Hobson, 2002, pp.…”

Section: What Is Autonomy?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The myth of cognitive agency: subpersonal thinking as a cyclically recurring loss of mental autonomy

Metzinger

2013

Front. Psychol.

106

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This metatheoretical paper investigates mind wandering from the perspective of philosophy of mind. It has two central claims. The first is that, on a conceptual level, mind wandering can be fruitfully described as a specific form of mental autonomy loss. The second is that, given empirical constraints, most of what we call “conscious thought” is better analyzed as a subpersonal process that more often than not lacks crucial properties traditionally taken to be the hallmark of personal-level cognition - such as mental agency, explicit, consciously experienced goal-directedness, or availability for veto control. I claim that for roughly two thirds of our conscious life-time we do not possess mental autonomy (M-autonomy) in this sense. Empirical data from research on mind wandering and nocturnal dreaming clearly show that phenomenally represented cognitive processing is mostly an automatic, non-agentive process and that personal-level cognition is an exception rather than the rule. This raises an interesting new version of the mind-body problem: How is subpersonal cognition causally related to personal-level thought? More fine-grained phenomenological descriptions for what we called “conscious thought” in the past are needed, as well as a functional decomposition of umbrella terms like “mind wandering” into different target phenomena and a better understanding of the frequent dynamic transitions between spontaneous, task-unrelated thought and meta-awareness. In an attempt to lay some very first conceptual foundations for the now burgeoning field of research on mind wandering, the third section proposes two new criteria for individuating single episodes of mind-wandering, namely, the “self-representational blink” (SRB) and a sudden shift in the phenomenological “unit of identification” (UI). I close by specifying a list of potentially innovative research goals that could serve to establish a stronger connection between mind wandering research and philosophy of mind.

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“…The function of hippocampus and amygdala during sleep may be complementary, since the retrieval of cues of fearconditioning stimuli has proved capable to affect the emotional quality of dream experience of NREMS [Wamsley and Antrobus, 2009]. During wakefulness, both hippocampus and amygdala are involved in the processing and execution of fear memories [Selden et al, 1991], and recent studies on the circuitry of fear conditioning and extinction point to the basolateral amygdala as the primary site of initial plasticity of both fear and extinction memory, with hippocampus mediating contextual aspects of both [Ji and Maren, 2007;Quirk and Mueller, 2008;Milad et al, 2007].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Amygdala and hippocampus volumetry and diffusivity in relation to dreaming

Gennaro

Cipolli

Cherubini

et al. 2010

Human Brain Mapping

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Microstructural analyses by MRI brain scans and by DTI analysis of MR images were used to investigate the possible relationship between deep gray matter structures (amygdala and hippocampus) and dreaming in healthy subjects. Thirty-four subjects ranging in age 20s to 70s underwent to a MRI protocol for the assessment of volume and mean diffusivity (MD) in the amygdala and hippocampus and were asked to fill out a dream diary via audiotape recording upon morning awakening for two weeks. Multiple regression analyses evaluated the relationships between anatomical measures and quantitative and qualitative measures of the reported dreams. The main result points to a dissociation between some quantitative and qualitative aspects of dream reports. While the mean number of dreams recalled per day did not show any significant relationship with the neuroanatomical measures, significant associations with some qualitative features of the recalled dreams (emotional load, bizarreness, and vividness) and, to some extent, with the length of dream reports were observed. Particularly, a higher MD of the left amygdala, reflecting a decreased microstructural integrity, was associated with shorter dream reports and lower scores on emotional load. Bizarreness of dream reports was negatively correlated with the left amygdala volume and positively correlated with the right amygdala MD. Some specific, although weaker, relationships were also found between bizarreness and hippocampal measures. These findings indicate some direct relationships between volumetric and ultrastructural measures of the hippocampus-amygdala complex and specific qualitative features of dreaming.

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The expression of trace conditioning during non-REM sleep and its relation to subjective experience

Cited by 21 publications

References 66 publications

Cognitive and emotional processes during dreaming: A neuroimaging view

Cognitive and emotional processes during dreaming: A neuroimaging view

The myth of cognitive agency: subpersonal thinking as a cyclically recurring loss of mental autonomy

Amygdala and hippocampus volumetry and diffusivity in relation to dreaming

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