The exploitative function of party patronage: does it serve the party's interest?

Abstract

An extensive body of literature refers to the informal linkage channels developed and supported by political parties as part of their survival strategy. This article's contribution to the existing literature is twofold. First, it presents original empirical evidence on the party patronage phenomenon in the post-communist context, which gives us a better understanding of the specific mechanisms that grant discretionary control over public resources. Second, this article extends our theoretical understanding of the functions of party patronage by exploring the exploitative function performed by patronage networks, and evaluates their potential detrimental effects for the patron parties.

Personal or Party Roots of Civil Service Patronage? Ministerial Change Effects on the Appointments of Top Civil Servants

“…Professional traits and career backgrounds of the top civil servants may explain why ministers keep some civil servants and fire others (Bach & Veit, 2017; Fleischer, 2016; Veit & Scholz, 2016). Less sanguine accounts point out the potentially exploitative function of patronage, serving the political elites’ personal gain via channeling state resources to private coffers (Innes, 2014; Volintiru, 2015). Alternatively, ministers may reach out to their networks to seek administrators whom they trust.…”

Budgetary Clientelism and Decentralization in Hungary and Romania

“…The more power is concentrated in a central office, in both political and economic terms, the more likely it is that local governments become dependent agents of the party leadership. Dependent local leaders are more likely to become clientelistic brokers, that is agents of the political principle, rather than accountable to voters' needs, that is agents of their constituencies (Aspinall, 2014;Volintiru, 2015). Within a clientelistic system, local leaders act as party brokers and often have privileged access to jobs in the state apparatus (Kopecký et al, 2012).…”

Conceptualization of Party Patronage

“…Šį platų partinio patronažo tyrimą papildo ir kitų autorių darbai, skirti pavienėms valstybėms: Volintiru [48] tyrė išnaudotojišką partinio patronažo funkciją Rumunijoje, Roperʼis [41] analizavo, kokią įtaką rinkimų rezultatams Rumunijoje turėjo partinis patronažas ir valstybinis politinių partijų finansavimas, Szczerbiakʼas [44] tyrė valstybinį finansavimą ir patronažą posovietinėje Lenkijoje, Gwiazda [12] analizavo partinį patronažą Lenkijoje, Kristinssonʼas [23] -Islandijoje, Rybarʼas [38] pateikė duomenis apie viešųjų išteklių svarbą partijoms kurti Slovakijoje. Ennser-Jedenastikʼas [8] Lietuvos autorių indėlis tiriant partinį patronažą kol kas nėra didelis, tačiau keletą darbų verta paminėti.…”