The Explanatory Power of Deflationary Truth

Abstract

It is widely believed that deflationary truth has no explanatory power. I will argue that it does. Specifically, I will consider some objections to deflationary truth having explanatory power, and argue that they fail. The position which will emerge is that the deflationary concept of truth is analogous to the concept of an average. Scientists take averages to be explanatory, and I will argue that the concept of deflationary truth is explanatory in the same way. I then argue that this deflationary concept of truth motivates a theory of the property of truth which is metaphysically disunified, but that this is no obstacle to explanation. This leads to a way of understanding the deflationary/substantive distinction in terms of grounding.

Truth and the Unity of Logical Validity

“…12 Some authors have argued that deflationism does actually support explanations. Most recently, Bradley (2023) has defended the claim that the concept of (deflationary) truth can be explanatory even if its property is metaphysically disunified. Since what is at stake in this paper is precisely metaphysical unity, however, such a view does not seem to pose a particular problem.…”