The Experience Machine Objection to Desire Satisfactionism

Lowe, Dan; STENBERG, JOSEPH

doi:10.1017/apa.2017.24

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…12 While this is frequently cited as a virtue of desire theories, it may be that these views do not fare much better than hedonism when it comes to the experience machine (Lowe and Stenberg 2017). This is because, while some desires are frustrated in the machine, it is possible that overall more desires are fulfilled than they would be in the real world.…”

Section: Stability-adjusted Desire Theories Of Well-beingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Well-being and the Problem of Unstable Desires

Mariqueo-Russell

2023

Utilitas

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This paper considers a new problem for desire theories of well-being. The problem claims that these theories are implausible because they misvalue the effects of fleeting desires, long-standing desires, and fluctuations in desire strength on well-being. I begin by investigating a version of the desire theory of well-being, simple concurrentism, that fails to capture intuitions in these cases. I then argue that desire theories of well-being that are suitably stability-adjusted can avoid this problem. These theories claim that the average strength of a desire, and the length of time that it is held, both influence the extent to which its fulfilment or frustration affects well-being. I end by considering whether value-fulfilment theories of well-being have a more attractive response to this problem. I find that these theories have significant downsides that make them unappealing alternatives.

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Section: Stability-adjusted Desire Theories Of Well-beingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Well-being and the Problem of Unstable Desires

Mariqueo-Russell

2023

Utilitas

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Concurrent Awareness Desire Satisfactionism

Forrester

2023

Utilitas

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Desire satisfactionists are united by their belief that what makes someone well-off is the satisfaction of their desires. But this commitment obscures a number of underlying differences, since there are several theoretical choice points on the way to making this commitment precise. This article is about two of the most important choice points. The first concerns an epistemic requirement on well-being. Suppose that one's desire that P is satisfied. Must one also know (or believe, or justifiably believe) that one's desire that P is satisfied in order to benefit from P? If so, there is an epistemic requirement on well-being. The second concerns the time at which one benefits. Well-being is a temporal phenomenon: given that one benefits from the satisfaction of one's desire that P, when does one benefit? Perhaps one benefits at the times at which one desires P, or the times at which P obtains, or both. I defend a view I call “concurrent awareness desire satisfactionism”: one benefits only at times at which both one desires P and P obtains (concurrence) and one benefits only if one is aware that one's desire is satisfied (awareness). I motivate this view by showing how it gives us solutions to many of the canonical problems facing desire satisfactionism. Then I put the two parts of the view together and explore some of its further implications. Ultimately, I conclude that well-being is an organic unity composed of a desiderative component, an epistemic component, and a worldly component, none of which are valuable on their own, but which are valuable when they are related in the right way.

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The Experience Machine Objection to Desire Satisfactionism

Cited by 2 publications

References 11 publications

Well-being and the Problem of Unstable Desires

Well-being and the Problem of Unstable Desires

Concurrent Awareness Desire Satisfactionism

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