2013
DOI: 10.1086/673208
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The Evolution of Property Rights: State Law or Informal Norms?

Abstract: This paper investigates the factors that have shaped the evolution of property rights institutions. Using a regression discontinuity design, I show that the divergent state laws of Ghana and Cô te d'Ivoire have had little effect on de facto property rights institutions. In contrast, the data show that these states' laws and policies have had large impacts on other economic outcomes. Furthermore, I show that part of the substantial within-country variation in property rights institutions is explained by economi… Show more

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Cited by 53 publications
(47 citation statements)
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References 32 publications
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“…In his systematic exploration of property rights institutions and development across the Ivory Coast-Ghana border, Bubb (2013) documents that while the two countries have quite distinct formal ( de jure ) institutions governing land rights (with Ghana, unlike Ivory Coast, explicitly recognizing customary law), there are no differences in the actual enforcement of property rights. Using a regression discontinuity approach that identifies the effect of national institutions at the border Bubb (2013) shows that households on either side of the border enjoy similar land rights.…”
Section: Chiefsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…In his systematic exploration of property rights institutions and development across the Ivory Coast-Ghana border, Bubb (2013) documents that while the two countries have quite distinct formal ( de jure ) institutions governing land rights (with Ghana, unlike Ivory Coast, explicitly recognizing customary law), there are no differences in the actual enforcement of property rights. Using a regression discontinuity approach that identifies the effect of national institutions at the border Bubb (2013) shows that households on either side of the border enjoy similar land rights.…”
Section: Chiefsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Using a regression discontinuity approach that identifies the effect of national institutions at the border Bubb (2013) shows that households on either side of the border enjoy similar land rights. These are subject to local customary law (dating to the pre-colonial states of the Ashanti and the Akan) and the power of local chiefs on either side of the border.…”
Section: Chiefsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…For example, Mamdani () argues that the legacy of colonialism in Africa is a bifurcated state where decentralized despotism rules in the rural areas and democratic institutions govern relations in the urban areas. The creation of customary institutions in the rural areas empowers local chiefs/tribal leaders and their influence persists nowadays, affecting property rights (Bubb, ), the redistribution of land (Goldstein and Udry, ), corruption and communal despotism (Lange, ).…”
Section: Channelsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Sin embargo, a pesar de las ganancias en eficiencia que los derechos de propiedad tienen sobre la producción agrícola y la inversión, estas no parecen ser homogéneas en todos los casos. Es posible que persistan formas tradicionales de tenencia, aún cuando existen esquemas legales (o de jure) que privilegian la propiedad privada, sobre todo cuando se está en las fronteras de los Estados donde la seguridad de los derechos es débil (Bubb, 2013;Campante y Do, 2014).…”
Section: Introductionunclassified