The Evolution of Price Discrimination in Transportation and its Implications for the Internet

Odlyzko, Andrew

doi:10.2202/1446-9022.1055

Cited by 57 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…In these situations, marginal cost pricing does not recover costs and sellers have strong incentives to price discriminate, namely to charge prices that differ across different customers, depending on those customers' willingness and ability to pay. Odlyzko (2004) presents many examples from postal services, canals, lighthouses and other industries, where price discrimination played an important role. It was common for tolls on canals or river navigation projects to vary dramatically depending on the nature of the cargo.…”

Section: Economic Theory (A ) Fixed and Variable Costsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Too expensive to meter: the influence of transaction costs in transportation and communication

Levinson

Odlyzko

2008

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A.

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Technology appears to be making fine-scale charging (as in tolls on roads that depend on time of day or even on current and anticipated levels of congestion) increasingly feasible. Such charging also appears to be increasingly desirable, as traffic on roads continues to grow and costs and public opposition limit new construction. Similar incentives towards fine-scale charging also appear to be operating in communications and other areas, such as electricity usage. Standard economic theory supports such measures and technology is being developed and deployed to implement them. But their spread is not very rapid and their prospects for the future are uncertain. This paper presents a collection of sketches, ranging from ancient history to very recent developments, that illustrate the costs that charging imposes. Some of those costs are explicit (in terms of the monetary costs to users and the costs of implementing the charging mechanisms). Others are implicit, such as the time or the mental processing costs of users. These argue that the case for fine-scale charging is not unambiguous and that in many cases such charging may lead to undesirable outcomes.

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Section: Economic Theory (A ) Fixed and Variable Costsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Too expensive to meter: the influence of transaction costs in transportation and communication

Levinson

Odlyzko

2008

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A.

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“…Odlyzko, 2004). It must be pointed out that there is no one system that is better than all the others and that could be centrally adopted as a pricing objective.…”

Section: Competition On the Markets For Transport Servicesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Fallacies of Network Neutrality Regulation

Knieps¹,

Zenhäusern²

2008

Competition and Regulation in Network Industries

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may Abstract:In this paper, historical functionalities of the traditional Internet are contrasted with today's Internet functionalities of the "smart" Internet architecture. It is shown that network neutrality regulation prohibiting congestion management and traffic quality differentiation is contrary to economically founded allocation mechanisms. By unbundling regulation of local loop bottleneck components the transfer of market power from the telecommunications infrastructure into the complementary Internet access service markets can be avoided. Regulation between access service providers and Internet application service providers is not only superfluous but detrimental.

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“…Researchers have pointed out that price discrimination was an effective means of regulation in the development of many traditional transport systems, and the effect of price discrimination tended to intensify over time [17,18]. Therefore, research regarding dynamic pricing of public transportation attracts researchers attention increasingly [19].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bidirectional Incentive Model for Bicycle Redistribution of a Bicycle Sharing System during Rush Hour

Shan

2016

Sustainability

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Abstract:Redistribution is an important part of operational activities in a bicycle sharing system (BSS). This paper proposes that there are two types of users in a BSS: leisure travelers and commuters. The operators and the government are adopting the bidirectional incentive model (BIM) to improve their service level of redistribution. That is, the BIM stimulates leisure travelers to actively respond to bicycle resetting needs of the system; on the other hand, it guides commuters by encouraging them to avoid travelling in peak periods. This is beneficial to achieve the goals of reducing the scheduling pressure on bicycles during rush hour, and even to realize the self-resetting of the BSS. In this paper, we explore three scenarios for implementing BIM through cooperation between the operator and the government. By exploiting Stackelberg games in all models, we illustrate the quantity of users in three different travel behaviors, and surplus value of these users respectively. We also consider the trend of the profit of the operator and the government when some changes of parameters are made. The numerical analysis and case discussion find that the strategy of the operator implementing BIM with a subsidy is the best method for developed regions. In a developing region, the strategy of implementing the BIM with a direct government subsidy to users is the best choice in a small or tourist city. In these cities, the proportion of leisure travelers is always larger than 50%, resulting in a significant incentive effect. The strategy of the operator implementing BIM without a subsidy is the best choice for the large and medium-sized city.

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The Evolution of Price Discrimination in Transportation and its Implications for the Internet

Cited by 57 publications

References 36 publications

Too expensive to meter: the influence of transaction costs in transportation and communication

Too expensive to meter: the influence of transaction costs in transportation and communication

The Fallacies of Network Neutrality Regulation

Bidirectional Incentive Model for Bicycle Redistribution of a Bicycle Sharing System during Rush Hour

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