The Evolution of Power and the Divergence of Cooperative Norms

Abstract

We consider a model of multilevel selection and the evolution of institutions that distribute power in the form of influence in a group’s collective interactions with other groups. In the absence of direct group-level interactions, groups with the most cooperative members will outcompete less cooperative groups, while within any group the least cooperative members will be the most successful. Introducing group-level interactions, however, such as raiding or warfare, changes the selective landscape for groups. Our model suggests that as the global population becomes more integrated and the rate of intergroup conflict increases, selection increasingly favors unequally distributed power structures, where individual influence is weighted by acquired resources. The advantage to less democratic groups rests in their ability to allow most of their members to cooperate – both among themselves and with outsiders – in order to produce the resources necessary to fuel their success in inter-group conflicts, while freeing their leaders from carrying those prosocial norms over to their behavior in inter-group interactions. The coevolution of cooperative social norms and institutions of power facilitates the emergence of a leadership class of the selfish and has implications for theories of inequality, structures of governance, non-cooperative personality traits, and hierarchy. Our findings suggest an amendment to the well-known doctrine of multilevel selection that “Selfishness beats altruism within groups. Altruistic groups beat selfish groups.” In an interconnected world, altruistic groups led by selfish individuals can beat them both. JEL Codes: C73, Z10

Reducing global inequality increases local cooperation: a simple model of group selection with a global externality

“…[13]) versus those in which there is an explicit top-down mechanism for group selection. The specific mechanism of group selection can take several possible forms, including: conflict, so that groups with more defectors are more likely to lose in conflict and be replaced by members of groups with more cooperators [11,39,[43][44][45]; cultural transmission, where institutions of more successful groups are more likely to be imitated by other groups [40,42,[46][47][48]; and payoff-biased migration, where individuals preferentially leave less successful groups to join groups that are more successful [41,49].…”

“…Bowles & Choi [46] propose a formal model to show how altruism and parochialism, which captures hostility toward out-group members, can co-evolve together owing to group selection, although both behaviours reduce individual payoffs. As another example, using a model of intergroup conflict, Makowsky & Smaldino [45] show how institutions that promote inequality may naturally divide a population into a ruling class of non-cooperators and an underclass of cooperators whose contributions sustain the group.…”

The ecology of wealth inequality in animal societies

“…Another broadly operating hypothesized driver of inequality is intergroup conflict. When unequal groups are more effective or willing competitors, selection for success in intergroup conflicts can lead to increased withingroup inequality in influence during collective action [79,105,106], and these leaders can also use their influence to increase inequality in other dimensions of wealth [107]. Here there is potential for positive feedback when the individuals that benefit most from intergroup conflict are also effective initiators of these conflicts, as seen in humans and banded mongoose (Mungos mungo) [108,109].…”

Research on Local Government Governance and Enterprise Social Responsibility Behaviors under the Perspective of Cournot Duopoly Competition: Analyzing Taxi Companies and Online Car-Hailing Service Companies

“…The traditional means of "governance" tends to make enterprises gradually deviate from social responsibility. As new technology and new commercial activities emerge, the local government should use Internet technology and web-thinking and change from a single-government control approach to a cooperative governance model [42,43]. As for online car-hailing services and taxis, the cooperative governance model of "local government + platform + driver + passenger" should be used.…”