The evolution of norms

Chalub, Fabio A. C. C.; Santos, Francisco C.; Pacheco, Jorge M.

doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.11.028

Cited by 84 publications

(83 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Giving help to a good individual and refusing help to a bad individual lead to a good reputation, while refusing help to a good and giving help to a bad one lead to bad reputation under stern-judging norm. We note here that Chalub et al (2006) had the same conclusion by using a similar model framework. Stern-judging is among the leading-eight norms found by Iwasa (2004, 2006), although stern-judging is successful in a multilevel selection process while leading-eight norms are only stable against the invasion of rare non-cooperative strategies under individual level selection.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 75%

“…Wedekind and Milinski, 2000;Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003), and a range of analytical and numerical investigations (e.g. Leimar and Hammerstein, 2001;Brandt and Sigmund, 2004;Boyd, 2003, 2004;Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2004;Chalub et al, 2006;Pacheco et al, 2006). Leimar and Hammerstein (2001) pointed out that image scoring is not an evolutionary stable strategy if group structure of human populations and inherent decision stochasticity is taken into account.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Similarly to Leimar and Hammerstein's (2001) and Brandt and Sigmund's (2004) works, most studies emphasised that ancient human populations lived in small interacting groups, thus cooperative norms and social institutions are evolved through cultural group selection Bowles and Gintis, 2003;Pacheco et al, 2006;Chalub et al, 2006). While the group structure of hunter-gatherer societies is obvious (Ember, 1978;Richerson et al, 2001;Soltis et al, 1995), the group selection mechanism is widely debated by arguing that group (or multilevel) selection can be explained more naturally by kin selection mechanism (Traulsen and Nowak, 2006;Taylor and Nowak, 2007;Lehmann et al, 2007).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evolution of generous cooperative norms by cultural group selection

Scheuring

2009

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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Evolution of cooperative norms is studied in a population where individual and group level selection are both in operation. Individuals play indirect reciprocity game within their group. Individuals are well informed about the previous actions and reputations, and follow second order norms. Individuals are norm-followers, and imitate their successful group mates. In contrast to previous models where norms classify actions deterministically, we assume that norms determine only the probabilities of actions, and mutants can differ in these probabilities. The central question is how a selective cooperative norm can emerge in a population where initially only non-cooperative norms were present. It is shown that evolution leads to a cooperative state if generous cooperative strategies are dominant, although the "always defecting" and the "always cooperating"-like strategies remain stably present. The characteristics of these generous cooperative strategies and the presence of always defecting and always cooperating strategies are in concordance with experimental observations.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 75%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evolution of generous cooperative norms by cultural group selection

Scheuring

2009

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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“…We mention, in particular, Chalub et al (2006) and Pacheco et al (2006), which apply numerical simulations to a group selection scenario. We also refer to Brandt and Sigmund (2004), where two third-order rules called STANDING and JUDGING are compared (which are closely related to SUGDEN and KANDORI respectively).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Within the context of second-order assessment rules belonging to the leading eight, the sterner rule has an advantage (see also Chalub et al (2006) and Pacheco et al (2006)), but evolution converges to a state where both rules can coexist and always agree. We can also find an explicit expression for the region P 3 = P 4 , usinḡ …”

Section: Just As In Ohtsuki Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity

Uchida¹,

Sigmund

2010

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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Indirect reciprocity is one of the basic mechanisms to sustain mutual cooperation.Beneficial acts are returned, not by the recipient, but by third parties. Indirect reciprocity is based on reputation and status: it pays to provide help because this makes one more likely to receive help in turn. The mechanism depends on knowing the past behavior of other players, and assessing that behavior. There are many different systems of assessing other individuals, which can be interpreted as rudimentary moral systems (i.e. views on what is 'good' or 'bad'). In this paper, we describe the competition of some of the leading assessment rules called SUGDEN and KANDORI by analytic methods. We show that the sterner rule KANDORI has a slight advantage in the sense that KANDORI-players have more chance to earn higher payoff than SUGDEN-players in the presence of unconditional altruists. On the other hand, we see that the unconditional altruists are eliminated in the long run and that stable polymorphisms of KANDORI and SUGDEN can subsist, but that a moral consensus is realized even in those polymorphic states: all players' images are the same in each observer's eyes.

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Social motives in children: Greed and fear in a social bargaining game

Zhen

2022

Behavioral Decision Making

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Cooperation often coexists with defection in social interactions. Individuals may choose non‐cooperation in social dilemmas either out of fear (fear of being exploited by a non‐cooperative player) or out of greed (the desire to increase private payoff by defecting from a cooperative player). However, the developmental trajectories of such motives in social interactions remain unclear. In order to find out how fear and greed influence children's cooperative behaviors differentially, children aged 7 to 11 were tested in Study 1 using a modified repeated one‐shot prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) in which the incentives to be greedy or fearful were parametrically and independently manipulated. Results showed that children were sensitive to the greed effect at age 7 and their sensitivity was stable across middle childhood, while only 11‐year‐old children were significantly affected by fear when the greed level was low. These findings suggest that in the context of PDG, sensitivity to social threat increases with age across middle childhood especially under low temptation to exploit others, and the greed motive may be less influenced by age in this period. By continuing to use the same experiment with young adults, Study 2 revealed that young adults also demonstrated a diminished fear motive when the greed level was low in the PDG. Moreover, the sensitivity to social motives of 11‐year‐olds was comparable to the levels of young adults. Together, the present findings confirm that two different social motives underlie the development of cooperation in middle childhood.

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The evolution of norms

Cited by 84 publications

References 26 publications

Evolution of generous cooperative norms by cultural group selection

Evolution of generous cooperative norms by cultural group selection

The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity

Social motives in children: Greed and fear in a social bargaining game

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