The evolution of index signals to avoid the cost of dishonesty

Biernaskie, Jay M.; Grafen, Alan; Perry, Jennifer C.

doi:10.1098/rspb.2014.0876

Cited by 80 publications

(85 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…For example, if call frequency is physically correlated with body size, then calls can provide honest information about fighting ability (Davies & Halliday, ; Fitch & Hauser, ). However, we note that a recent theoretical treatment posits that index signals can be considered a proximate mechanism that produces a costly signal, with costly signalling theory providing the ultimate (adaptive) explanation for the evolution of this type of signal (Biernaskie et al ., ).…”

Section: Models Of Signal Stabilitymentioning

confidence: 97%

Are aposematic signals honest? A review

Summers

Speed

Blount

et al. 2015

J of Evolutionary Biology

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We explore the relevance of honest signalling theory to the evolution of aposematism. We begin with a general consideration of models of signal stability, with a focus on the Zahavian costly signalling framework. Next, we review early models of signalling in the context of aposematism (some that are consistent and some inconsistent with costly honest signalling). We focus on controversies surrounding the idea that aposematic signals are handicaps in a Zahavian framework. Then, we discuss how the alignment of interests between signaller and predator influences the evolution of aposematism, highlight the distinction between qualitative and quantitative honesty and review theory and research relevant to these categories. We also review recent theoretical treatments of the evolution of aposematism that have focused on honest signalling as well as empirical research on a variety of organisms, including invertebrates and frogs. Finally, we discuss future directions for empirical and theoretical research in this area.

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Section: Models Of Signal Stabilitymentioning

confidence: 97%

Are aposematic signals honest? A review

Summers

Speed

Blount

et al. 2015

J of Evolutionary Biology

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“…However, while certain animal signals do appear to impose a cost, as argued by Számadó and put well by Biernaskie et al “the maintenance of honesty does not require a realized cost paid by honest signallers, as in Zahavi's view of the handicap principle, but rather a potential cost for dishonesty” (see Box ). The demonstration of cost itself may be sufficient to distinguish between strategic signals, which involve a realized strategic cost, and other types of costly signaling where costs are paid by potential deviations from an honest equilibrium.…”

Section: Handicaps and The Honest Signaling Hypothesis In Zoologymentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Punishment of cheaters, where individuals are punished for signaling dishonestly, is an alternative mechanism where, although it is costly for signallers to deviate from an honest equilibrium, signallers need not pay any realized strategic costs (Box ). Indices, that is, signals which are reliable because they are impossible to fake (Boxes and ), may also provide a mechanism by which signal honesty is guaranteed without associated strategic costs, although this framing of the index concept has been criticized (see Reference ).…”

Section: Handicaps and The Honest Signaling Hypothesis In Zoologymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For this reason, Számadó, Higham, and others have argued that costly signaling and the handicap principle are not one and the same (Box ). Handicap signaling sensu Zahavi predicts that signallers must necessarily pay a realized strategic cost, while costly signaling is any system by which signal honesty is maintained at equilibrium through costs incurred for signaling dishonestly by deviating from that equilibrium (potential costs), though which need not involve realized strategic costs.…”

Section: Handicaps and The Honest Signaling Hypothesis In Zoologymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Costly signaling and the handicap principle in hunter‐gatherer research: A critical review

Stibbard‐Hawkes

2019

Evolutionary Anthropology

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It has been argued that men's hunting in many forager groups is not, primarily, a means of family provisioning but is a costly way of signaling otherwise cryptic qualities related to hunting ability. Much literature concerning the signaling value of hunting draws links to Zahavi's handicap principle and the costly signaling literature in zoology. However, although nominally grounded in the same theoretical paradigm, these literatures have evolved separately. Here I review honest signaling theory in both hunter‐gatherer studies and zoology and highlight three issues with the costly signaling literature in hunter‐gather studies: (a) an overemphasis on the demonstration of realized costs, which are neither necessary nor sufficient to diagnose costly signaling; (b) a lack of clear predictions about what specific qualities hunting actually signals; and (c) an insufficient focus on the broadcast effectiveness of hunting and its value as a heuristics for signal recipients. Rather than signaling hunting prowess, hunting might instead facilitate reputation‐building.

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“…Furthermore, recent mathematical models indicate that the evolution of index signals can also be explained by differential costs (Biernaskie et al. ). Therefore, both handicaps and indices share a link to intrinsic physiological condition to guarantee honesty, while conventional signals rely on extrinsic sources of reliability.…”

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confidence: 99%

Real-time social selection maintains honesty of a dynamic visual signal in cooperative fish

et al. 2017

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Our understanding of animal communication has been largely driven by advances in theory since empirical evidence has been difficult to obtain. Costly signaling theory became the dominant paradigm explaining the evolution of honest signals, according to which communication reliability relies on differential costs imposed on signalers to distinguish animals of different quality. On the other hand, mathematical models disagree on the source of costs at the communication equilibrium. Here, we present an empirical framework to study the evolution of honest signals that generates predictions on the form, function, and sources of reliability of visual signals. We test these predictions on the facial color patterns of the cooperatively breeding Princess of Burundi cichlid, Neolamprologus brichardi. Using theoretical visual models and behavioral experiments we show that these patterns possess stable chromatic properties for efficient transmission in the aquatic environment, while dynamic changes in signal luminance are used by the fish to communicate switches in aggressive intent. By manipulating signal into out‐of‐equilibrium expression and simulating a cheater invasion, we demonstrate that social costs (receiver retaliation) promote the honesty of this dynamic conventional signal. By directly probing the sender of a signal in real time, social selection is likely to be the mechanism of choice shaping the evolution of inexpensive, yet reliable context‐dependent social signals in general.

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The evolution of index signals to avoid the cost of dishonesty

Cited by 80 publications

References 43 publications

Are aposematic signals honest? A review

Are aposematic signals honest? A review

Costly signaling and the handicap principle in hunter‐gatherer research: A critical review

Real-time social selection maintains honesty of a dynamic visual signal in cooperative fish

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