2020
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2230.12503
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The Evolution of EU Antitrust Policy: 1966–2017

Abstract: This article describes, and puts in context, the evolution of the enforcement practice of the European Commission in the area of EU antitrust law (Articles 101 and 102 TFEU). It considers all formal decisions adopted in the period between 1966 -when the European Court of Justice delivered the two seminal rulings that marked the discipline -and the end of 2017. The article classifies Commission decisions in accordance with four enforcement paradigms. The descriptive statistics show that the cases that the Commi… Show more

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Cited by 8 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…102 The introduction of decidedly non-economic evidence in the VBER evaluation can be considered as being at odds with EU competition law's general purported focus on welfare effects as prime evidence. At the same time, the Commission's stated reliance on consumer welfare as the North star for competition policy has been criticized in the literature: some authors point out how consumer welfare at best is one out of many goals of competition law, 103 and others point to the CJEU's case law continuing to go beyond consumer welfare as a narrow focus of competition law. 104 When competition law enforcement and litigation in practice considers evidence beyond consumer welfare to begin with, a narrow focus on consumer welfare can hardly be expected in legislation.…”
Section: Economic Evidence In the Vber Evaluationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…102 The introduction of decidedly non-economic evidence in the VBER evaluation can be considered as being at odds with EU competition law's general purported focus on welfare effects as prime evidence. At the same time, the Commission's stated reliance on consumer welfare as the North star for competition policy has been criticized in the literature: some authors point out how consumer welfare at best is one out of many goals of competition law, 103 and others point to the CJEU's case law continuing to go beyond consumer welfare as a narrow focus of competition law. 104 When competition law enforcement and litigation in practice considers evidence beyond consumer welfare to begin with, a narrow focus on consumer welfare can hardly be expected in legislation.…”
Section: Economic Evidence In the Vber Evaluationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…30 It was only in the 1990s that events taking place in the energy sector were reviewed under Treaty rules on competition, which had been applied to many other sectors throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 31 The first cohesive body of case law in this area dates from the 1990s, which marked the end of the slow and incidental application of primary law to the energy sector that preceded it. 32 Explanations vary as to why this happened when it did.…”
Section: A the Application Of Primary Law To The Energy Sectormentioning
confidence: 99%