The evolution of cooperation by social exclusion

Sasaki, Tatsuya; Uchida, S.

doi:10.1098/rspb.2012.2498

Cited by 100 publications

(94 citation statements)

References 51 publications

(84 reference statements)

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“…But therein exclusion is carried out after the PGG takes place, towards the observed non-contributors, as in the model of Sasaki & Uchida [39], which is different from our model where restriction occurs before the game takes place. This suggests that social exclusion or ostracism, even when it requires an additional cost and/or has a reduced effect in terms of the restriction, is an important mechanism for promoting group cooperation [26,29].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 92%

Avoiding or restricting defectors in public goods games?

Pereira

Lenaerts

2015

J. R. Soc. Interface.

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When creating a public good, strategies or mechanisms are required to handle defectors. We first show mathematically and numerically that prior agreements with posterior compensations provide a strategic solution that leads to substantial levels of cooperation in the context of public goods games, results that are corroborated by available experimental data. Notwithstanding this success, one cannot, as with other approaches, fully exclude the presence of defectors, raising the question of how they can be dealt with to avoid the demise of the common good. We show that both avoiding creation of the common good, whenever full agreement is not reached, and limiting the benefit that disagreeing defectors can acquire, using costly restriction mechanisms, are relevant choices. Nonetheless, restriction mechanisms are found the more favourable, especially in larger group interactions. Given decreasing restriction costs, introducing restraining measures to cope with public goods free-riding issues is the ultimate advantageous solution for all participants, rather than avoiding its creation.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 92%

Avoiding or restricting defectors in public goods games?

Pereira

Lenaerts

2015

J. R. Soc. Interface.

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“…Note that coexistence and cooperative equilibria in these models always include cooperators and enforcers, thus issues of second-order free-riding prevail. Sasaki & Uchida [30] showed in a three-strategy model that social exclusion can overcome second-order free-riding even when it is costly and stochastic. Our model and results depart from these studies in important ways.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robustness of norm-driven cooperation in the commons

2016

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Sustainable use of common-pool resources such as fish, water or forests depends on the cooperation of resource users that restrain their individual extraction to socially optimal levels. Empirical evidence has shown that under certain social and biophysical conditions, self-organized cooperation in the commons can evolve. Global change, however, may drastically alter these conditions. We assess the robustness of cooperation to environmental variability in a stylized model of a community that harvests a shared resource. Community members follow a norm of socially optimal resource extraction, which is enforced through social sanctioning. Our results indicate that both resource abundance and a small increase in resource variability can lead to collapse of cooperation observed in the no-variability case, while either scarcity or large variability have the potential to stabilize it. The combined effects of changes in amount and variability can reinforce or counteract each other depending on their size and the initial level of cooperation in the community. If two socially separate groups are ecologically connected through resource leakage, cooperation in one can destabilize the other. These findings provide insights into possible effects of global change and spatial connectivity, indicating that there is no simple answer as to their effects on cooperation and sustainable resource use.

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“…punishing defectors or rewarding cooperators. On the one hand, cooperation can be enforced if individuals inflict sanctions on wrongdoers by punishing them (Sigmund, 2007) or by excluding them from the social group in order to avoid any future interactions with them (Guala, 2012;Sasaki & Uchida, 2013). On the other hand, cooperation can be based on reciprocity if individuals have a tendency to help those who have helped them in the past (i.e.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reputation based on punishment rather than generosity allows for evolution of cooperation in sizable groups

Santos

Wedekind

2015

Evolution and Human Behavior

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Citation: dos Santos M., Wedekind C. 2015. Reputation based on punishment rather than generosity allows for evolution of cooperation in sizable groups. Evolution and Human Behavior 36(1): 59-64.The content of this preprint is identical with the published paper except from small edits made at proofs. AbstractCooperation among unrelated individuals can arise if decisions to help others can be based on reputation. While working for dyadic interactions, reputation-use in social dilemmas involving many individuals (e.g. public goods games) becomes increasingly difficult as groups become larger and errors more frequent. Reputation is therefore believed to have played a minor role for the evolution of cooperation in collective action dilemmas such as those faced by early humans. Here, we show in computer simulations that a reputation system based on punitive actions can overcome these problems and, compared to reputation system based on generous actions, (i) is more likely to lead to the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups, (ii) more effectively sustains cooperation within larger groups, and (iii) is more robust to errors in reputation assessment. Punishment and punishment reputation could therefore have played crucial roles in the evolution of cooperation within larger groups of humans.

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The evolution of cooperation by social exclusion

Cited by 100 publications

References 51 publications

Avoiding or restricting defectors in public goods games?

Avoiding or restricting defectors in public goods games?

Robustness of norm-driven cooperation in the commons

Reputation based on punishment rather than generosity allows for evolution of cooperation in sizable groups

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