The Evil of Death

Silverstein, Harry S.

doi:10.2307/2025537

Cited by 121 publications

(18 citation statements)

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“…Silverstein argues that those who view death as a deprivation (or benefit) are ‘guilty of conflating the life/death comparative and the life/life comparative…’23 Bradley escapes the force of Epicurus’ challenge not by comparing life with death, but by claiming that death will not be very different to life in a coma. In comparing two scenarios (or possible worlds) for one person (Kris), Bradley is able to smuggle in the suggestion that death is a mode of possible existence for that person and is, therefore, directly comparable with life.…”

Section: Epicurus and Imagining Deathmentioning

confidence: 99%

QALYs, euthanasia and the puzzle of death

Barrie¹

2014

J Med Ethics

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This paper considers the problems that arise when death, which is a philosophically difficult concept, is incorporated into healthcare metrics, such as the quality-adjusted life year (QALY). These problems relate closely to the debate over euthanasia and assisted suicide because negative QALY scores can be taken to mean that patients would be 'better off dead'. There is confusion in the literature about the meaning of 0 QALY, which is supposed to act as an 'anchor' for the surveyed preferences on which QALYs are based. In the context of the debate over euthanasia, the QALY assumes an ability to make meaningful comparisons between life-states and death. Not only is this assumption questionable, but the ethical debate is much more broad than the question of whether death is preferable to a state of living. QALYs are derived from preferences about health states, so do not necessarily reflect preferences about events (eg, dying) or actions (eg, killing). This paper presents a new kind of problem for the QALY. As it stands, the QALY provides confused and unreliable information when it reports zero or negative values, and faces further problems when it appears to recommend death. This should preclude its use in the debate over euthanasia and assisted suicide. These problems only apply where the QALY involves or seems to involve a comparison between life-states and death, and are not relevant to the more general discussion of the use of QALYs as a tool for comparing the benefits derived from treatment options.

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Section: Epicurus and Imagining Deathmentioning

confidence: 99%

QALYs, euthanasia and the puzzle of death

Barrie¹

2014

J Med Ethics

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“…De la misma manera que hay eventos que no han ocurrido jamás, de los que no tenemos una experiencia sensible de ellos, pero que influyen psicológicamente transformándose en objeto de nuestras preocupaciones. Considérese un ejemplo tomado de Silverstein (1980) 7 , los británicos a principios de los años 1940 temían ser invadidos por los nazis, evento que nunca ocurrió ni ocurrirá. Esta preocupación era legítima y tenía como base una serie de especulaciones sobre las intenciones de los nazis.…”

Section: Tercero: Trascendencia a Través De La Muerteunclassified

La preocupación por la muerte

Laera¹

2013

Problemata: R. Intern. Fil.

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“…Additional life Death Better Worse Silverstein (1980Silverstein ( : pp. 410, 2000) recognises a problem with this.…”

Section: The Deprivation Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deprivation and the See-saw of Death

Wareham¹

2009

South African Journal of Philosophy

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Epicurus argued that death can be neither good nor bad because it involves neither pleasure nor pain. This paper focuses on the deprivation account as a response to this Hedonist Argument. Proponents of the deprivation account hold that Epicurus's argument fails even if death involves no painful or pleasurable experiences and even if the hedonist ethical system, which holds that pleasure and pain are all that matter ethically, is accepted. I discuss four objections that have been raised against the deprivation account and argue that this response to Epicurus's argument is successful once it has been sufficiently clarified.

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The Evil of Death

Cited by 121 publications

References 0 publications

QALYs, euthanasia and the puzzle of death

QALYs, euthanasia and the puzzle of death

La preocupación por la muerte

Deprivation and the See-saw of Death

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