The Evaluation of Second- and Third-Party Punishers

Abstract

Although punishment can promote cooperative behavior, the evolution of punishment requires benefi ts which override the cost. One possible source of the benefi t of punishing uncooperative behavior is obtaining a positive evaluation. This study compares evaluations of punishers and non-punishers. Two hundred and thirty-four undergraduate students participated in two studies. Study 1 revealed that, in the public goods game, punishers were not positively evaluated, while punishers were positively evaluated in the third-party punishment game. In Study 2, where the non-cooperator was a participant of a public goods game, we manipulated the punishers participation in the game. The results showed that punishers received no positive evaluations, regardless of their participation in the game, indicating that negative evaluation may not be a reaction toward aggression with retaliatory intentions.

Non-cooperation motivation is irrelevant: Negative evaluations of punishment in the public goods game, positive evaluations in the third-party punishment game

“…Further, such evaluations were unaffected by whether the punisher had participated in the PG-P. These results are consistent with previous reports [30] , indicating that punishment may be considered undesirable as a means of maintaining group order. While laboratory experiments have shown that individuals will enforce punishment when it is the only form of sanction [8,35] , anthropological studies have found that punishment is not preferred in natural settings [38,39] .…”

“…Speci cally, we focus on TPP with prisoner's dilemma game. Previous studies have shown a tendency for punishers to receive positive evaluations [30] . However, it is noteworthy that such literature usually employed a TPP with dictator game, where non-cooperative behavior is assumed to be solely generated by greed.…”

“…Because it is not possible to manipulate fear in a dictator game, the TPP included a two-person prisoner's dilemma. Based on our own results from Study 1 and previous ndings [30] , we developed the following two hypotheses: Hypothesis 2-1 (replication of Study 1): In the PG-P, the impression evaluations and intention to cooperate scores will be higher for non-punishers (vs punishers), regardless of the order condition. Hypothesis 2-2: In the rst and last conditions of the PG-P, the impression evaluations and intention to cooperate scores will be higher for non-punishers (vs punishers).…”

“…These inconsistencies highlight the need for direct comparisons between game types. In this regard, Mifune et al [30] found that punishers (vs non-punishers) were evaluated more negatively and more positively in the PG-P and TPP, respectively. As one possible explanation, these contrasting results may be attributable to the in uence of inferred motives for non-cooperative behavior.…”

Potential influence of decision time on punishment behavior and its evaluation

“…Furthermore, observers might fear competitive punishers; therefore, they are not evaluated favorably. In contrast, cooperative punishers are regarded more favorably and receive a positive evaluation; they are more likely to be chosen as partners ( Mifune et al, 2020 ; Tateishi et al, 2021 ). It should be also noted that, in the present study, neither the punishers nor non-punishers received negative evaluations in Study 1 and 2, 7 especially when such punishment was the result of the punishers’ deliberation.…”