Nelson Tebbe's Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age addresses an important political ethical issue: namely, the question how conflicts between religious freedom and equality should be resolved, as a matter of law. Such conflicts include, for instance, the refusal of religious business owners to provide services to same-sex couples, public officials objecting to samesex marriages for religious reasons, and matters of state (de)funding of religious organizations (e.g., adoption agencies) that discriminate on the basis of LGBT status. Tebbe identifies two more specific questions that he aims to answer in his book. First, we need to know how we can attain warranted positions on questions of religious freedom-that is, what we can or must do, how we should reason and argue about these matters. This is the methodological component of the book. Second, Tebbe asks how particular legal issues should be resolved. This is the substantive component of the book (8). I focus on the methodological component here, and my thoughts and comments are situated in the context of current debates about religious diversity and the role of religions in the public domain in many European societies. The fact that my considerations are informed by