The European Commission and the Enforcement of Environmental Law: an Invidious Position

The Implementation of EU Environmental Policy; A Policy Problem without a Political Solution?

“…by the Council. As far as environmental protection is concerned, the HU, therefore, breaches Stalin's first law of 'sound 1 governance; its primary task is to propose and to adopt policy, not to implement it, This unequal sharing of competences leaves the Commission, which is not directly elected, in a weak and 'invidious position' (Williams, 1994), It prefers not to stir up trouble with noncompliant slates in case it endangers the wider integrationist project or offends the publics which elected them. The common exceptions are when a particular state's behaviour is plainly egregious or when national groups strongly support, enforcement action (Puchala, 1975, page 513).…”

“…There is too little consultation with affected parties: the Commission does not always use advisory committees as well as it might (HOLSCEC, 1992a, page 9), and much of the scientific and technical advice used to prepare proposals is not made public (HOLSCEC, 1997, pages 15-18). The activities of the hundreds of COREPER (Committee of Permanent Representatives to the European Communities) and comitology committees which frame, implement, and amend policies are shrouded in secrecy (for a more detailed analysis, see Docksey and Williams, 1994;Dogan, 1997). Enforcement proceedings are stow, secretive, inflexible, complex, and dominated by states and the Commission: following the tradition in international diplomacy, the legal correspondence between the Commission and member states remains strictly confidential.…”

Renewable energy vs. biodiversity: Policy conflicts and the future of nature conservation

“…First, the case is arguably another example of political factors impinging on EU legal enforcement decisions, damaging the integrity of the rule of law. While one might argue that this is merely the realpolitik of enforcement in a supranational context, clear examples of such political impingement are in fact relatively rare at the EU level (see Williams, 1994Williams, , 2002Hedemann-Robinson, 2007;Krä mer, 2009b), and in any event such an argument does not excuse such conduct. Second, one wonders whether the Commission's handling of the Sabor dam has set a precedent: can the Member States hereafter expect the Commission to relax its application and enforcement of EU biodiversity law to facilitate large renewable energy projects?…”

Non-compliance in the European Union: pathology or statistical artefact?

“…130r(4) of the Treaty attributes the primary responsibility for implementing EU policies to the member states. It has been argued that the principle of decentralized enforcement of Community law leaves the Commission, which does not enjoy any direct political legitimation, in a weak and 'invidious position' (Williams 1994). Thus, the Commission may treat some member states more carefully than others because they are more powerful; for example, they make signi cant contributions to the EU budget or dispose of considerable voting power in the Council, or their population is very 'Eurosceptic' and the Commission is careful to avoid upsetting public opinion in these member states by of cially shaming them for non-compliance with Community law (Jordan 1999).…”