The EU’s stability-democracy dilemma in the context of the problematic accession of the Western Balkan states

Abstract

The accession of the remaining six Western Balkan states into the EU is shrouded in much uncertainty. Despite Croatia finally traversing the difficult path to eventual membership in 2013, not one of the remaining Western Balkan countries can claim to be on a definite pathway to membership today. An increasingly prevalent argument is that the EU's engagement with its neighbourhoods has faltered because its strategies have been undermined by an inherent stability-democracy dilemma. This article examines the EU's engagement with the Western Balkans and finds that although the EU tried to transcend this dilemma, in reality, a tension between stability and democracy was present with the former generally receiving more attention in policymaking. This led to not only a lack of tangible democratization amongst the Western Balkan states, but further uncertainty about their accession prospects. By 2018, it was clear that the EU's engagement with the Western Balkans needed a rethink, resulting in a new approach: the 'Six Flagship Initiatives'. However, given the apprehensiveness of some member states (especially France) coupled with the presence of outsiders such as Russia and China in the area, the accession prospects of the six non-EU Western Balkan states remains blurred.

The Mobility-Democracy Nexus Betrayed: When the European Commission’s Talks Fall Apart in the Mediterranean

“…Scholarship on the international dimension of democratization has emphasized the relevance of EU-level hindrances to norm promotion, pointing at the intrinsic inconsistencies and conflicting interests of EU policies towards its neighbourhood, often described as a sort of stability-democracy dilemma. 26 Börzel and Lebanidze, for instance, identify the concomitant absence of 'stability-democratisation' dilemmas and the presence of domestic-level 23 coalitions favourable to democratic reforms as essential conditions for democratic leverage to obtain. 27 In this regard, the EU's perception of a trade-off between stability and democracy in the Southern Mediterranean can result in a prioritization of stability and security concerns over normative aims.…”

Untitled

“…Overall, within the same constitutional revisions, the underlying secessionist tendencies are also recognized, with the elimination of Yugoslav symbols and, in the case of Slovenia, the proclamation of the superiority of the national constitution over the federal one. Following the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the successive constitutions adopted by the former constituent republics starting from 1992 reveal a mixture of elements inherited from the socialist past and others taken up by Western constitutionalism, with a large space dedicated to social rights and a residual provision of capital punishment alongside an expansion of rights, duties, and freedoms of citizens (Vorpsi, 2023;Smith et al, 2021;Lavrič & Bieber, 2020;Milačić, 2019;Konitzer, 2013;Losoncs, 2013). The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina represents a special case, the elaboration of which, contextually to the Dayton negotiations, is substantially otherdirected, with a role preponderant of the c.d.…”

Towards Gradual Integration of the Western Balkans Into the European Union: The Case of Serbia

“…The two mentioned aspects form the background of the faulty EU stabilocracy approach, whereby the preservation of stability has been blended with the promotion of democracy. Smith et al (2021) argue that stabilocratic elements limit the scope of democratic reforms, having in mind their essentially unstable rather than static character; that leads to "shallow Europeanisation", where transformative activities are insufficiently profound (Smith, Marković-Khaze, and Kovačević 2021, 170-171; Boerzel 2011, 8). Apart from observations that "achieving stability through democratization is inherently contradictory" (which is close to Schimmelfennig observations), another problem is the likelihood of failures and non-guaranteed or incomplete success (Smith, Marković, Khaze, and Kovačević 2021, 170-171; Shimmelfennig, 973-975).…”