2017
DOI: 10.1080/13629395.2017.1358901
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The EU and Islamist parties in Tunisia and Egypt after the Arab uprisings: A story of selective engagement

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Cited by 9 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…This is due, first, to security considerations, particularly prominent in the Egyptian case where more pressing terrorist threats, combined with the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood's experience, have pushed the EU to prioritize stability and security over democracy. Second, the engagement with the new elites in Tunisia compared to Egypt shows a differentiation in the EU attitude, as En-Nahda pushed the EU to revise its understanding of political Islam and the possibility to engage with some Islamist CSOs and parties, whereas the same does not occur in Egypt, because of both MB behaviour and the coup (see Voltolini & Colombo, 2017). Thus, the EU perceives engaging with Tunisia as less risky for security and stability than in Egypt -demonstrating the EU's inter-country differentiation.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…This is due, first, to security considerations, particularly prominent in the Egyptian case where more pressing terrorist threats, combined with the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood's experience, have pushed the EU to prioritize stability and security over democracy. Second, the engagement with the new elites in Tunisia compared to Egypt shows a differentiation in the EU attitude, as En-Nahda pushed the EU to revise its understanding of political Islam and the possibility to engage with some Islamist CSOs and parties, whereas the same does not occur in Egypt, because of both MB behaviour and the coup (see Voltolini & Colombo, 2017). Thus, the EU perceives engaging with Tunisia as less risky for security and stability than in Egypt -demonstrating the EU's inter-country differentiation.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A notable aspect of change in the EU attitude concerns fear of Islamist groups, long considered as a monolith. With the changes, we see a better understanding of the various Islamist groups that exist (see Voltolini & Colombo, 2017). Despite its earlier fears of an Islamist party in power, the EU has coordinated with the En-Nahda party and its attitude is positive and cooperative.…”
Section: Materials Means Of Engagementmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This differential engagement is attributed to the persistent influence of a traditional interpretation of the security-stability nexus in terms of hard security and regime stability as well as the reaction of partners in the two countries. In contrast, and with reference to Islamist political parties, Voltolini and Colombo (2017) show that the EU's interpretation of the security-stability nexus, interpreted in terms of threats to EU ontological security, has partially changed in the wake of the Arab uprisings. By differentiating between various forms of political Islam, the EU has started to engage with Ennahda in Tunisia, while its engagement with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has been less successful.…”
Section: Outline Of the Special Issuementioning
confidence: 89%
“…Kourtelis (2018) illustrates this point in socioeconomic terms in relation to EU strategies for rural development in the Arab Mediterranean. In the political field, Voltolini and Colombo (2018) point to some pernicious implications of the EU's engagement with Islamist parties that rebranded themselves as Muslim democrats to be acceptable to European partners, but which in doing so distanced themselves from some of their main domestic constituencies.…”
Section: Reconstructionmentioning
confidence: 99%