The Ethnic Trap: Notes on the Nigerian Campaign and Elections, 1978–79

Abstract

In his opening address to the fifty members of the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) on 18 October, 1975, the head of Nigeria’s new military government, General Murtala Ramat Muhammed, declared: “It is important that we avoid a reopening of the deep splits which caused trauma in the country.” Those splits, as was made known to the outside world during the civil war, were ethnic, regional, and, to a lesser extent, religious in nature. Of these three modes of overt division, Nigerians have always been most successful in controlling the religious aspect. General Murtala’s statement is instructive on the problem of regional splits: “The fear of the predominance of one Region over another has . . . been removed to a large extent by the simple Constitutional Act of creating more States.” Four months later, following the assassination of Murtala, the successor regime of General Obasanjo declared the creation of seven more states, bringing the number up to nineteen from the twelve established by General Gowon in May 1967. While it is evident that the existence of “regions” has not been obliterated by their subdivision into states, this development has reduced the immediate political visibility and at least some of the salience of regional boundaries.

Ethnic Conflict and Democracy in Nigeria: The Marginalisation Question

“…Against this background, the evenL<; of 1966 and 1967 can be regarded as ofl-shoots of the ethnic basis of partisan polities in Nigeria. The next attempt at partisan politics did not escape either what Joseph (1981) called the "cthnic trap".…”

Planning democracy in Africa: A comparative perspective on Nigeria and Ghana

“…Tensions peaked during the controversy over the interpretation of the results of the presidential election, which ushered Shehu Shagari into ofrice over the vociferous protest of UPN supporters. The sense of accomplishment expressed at the time of the inauguration of the Second Republic in October, 1979, was attenuated by concern over the conduct of the election campaign and the animosity generated by the presidential controversy (Joseph, 1981a: Joseph, 1981bSklar, 1981).…”

The political economy of development in weak states

“…A growing body of literature has located the role of the state in the political economy of development. Such studies include Knutsen (2010) which shows that dictatorship rule is a key reason for the proliferation of weak institutions and slow economic growth in sub‐Saharan African countries and that democracies contribute positively to economic growth in the region; North (1981) emphasises the self interest of the ruler and his group being in direct conflict with the desires of the citizens; Joseph (1981, 1987) which narrow down on the role of the state as an instrument of achieving prebendalistic spoils; the World Development Report (2002) which defines the role of institutions in economic growth by arguing that weak institutions make poverty endemic; and Acemoglu (2005) which demonstrates that both weak and strong states have the tendency to stifle economic growth and showing preference for states that are mid‐way between weak and strong as the best mechanism to organize society and pursue development. Other studies include Przeworski and Limongi (1993) who conclude that even though the nature of the regime in power is a key determinant of growth, neither democracies nor dictatorships had been shown to be better at organizing the machinery of growth.…”