The Ethics of Cyberweapons in Warfare

Rowe, Neil C.

doi:10.4018/jte.2010081002

Cited by 19 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…It now appears that some cyber-weapons can be highly discriminating Á more precise even than precision bombing. This is contrary to the position taken as recently as Rowe (2009). Discriminating attacks in cyberwarfare have been those on Syria and in the case of Stuxnet.…”

Section: Legal and Further Ethical Considerationsmentioning

confidence: 50%

Other-Than-Internet (Oti) Cyberwarfare: Challenges for Ethics, Law, and Policy

Dipert

2013

Journal of Military Ethics

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Almost all discussions of cyberwarfare, other cyber-attacks, and cyber-espionage have focused entirely on the Internet as the chief means of damage Á the Internet as a 'vector,' using a term from the theory of infectious diseases. However there are a variety of means, some of which have already been used, that involve cyber-exploitation using vectors other than the Internet. Malware can be installed in the integrated circuits of computers and servers, but also in any devices attached to them Á thumb drives, CDs, printers, scanners, and so on. One can also use various forms of electromagnetic radiation at a distance of meters or more to exfiltrate data or to infiltrate corrupt data. I call this large and diverse family of unwanted interference with the functioning of information processing systems other-than-Internet (OTI) attacks on information systems. Stuxnet, and probably the 2007 Israeli corruption of Syrian air defenses, were OTI attacks. Such OTI techniques are more difficult to develop than creating malware, requiring electronic manufacturing facilities or novel technologies, and are thus accessible only to larger corporations and technologically sophisticated countries. Particularly vulnerable would be countries (like the United States and Europe) whose information processing devices are mainly produced outside of the country. Once exploitations via the Internet become harder to perpetrate, OTI exploitations are certain to grow dramatically, eventually requiring equipment for critical uses to be expensively fabricated in (and transported using) secure facilities; expensive detection measures will have to be instituted. This will create challenges for policy, law, and ethics, as well as greatly increasing the cost of many electronic devices.

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Section: Legal and Further Ethical Considerationsmentioning

confidence: 50%

Other-Than-Internet (Oti) Cyberwarfare: Challenges for Ethics, Law, and Policy

Dipert

2013

Journal of Military Ethics

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“…Computer science professor and cyber expert, Neil Rowe (2007Rowe ( , 2008Rowe ( , 2010Rowe ( , 2011, for example, has published several papers raising an alarm that the weapons and tactics frequently and (from the standpoint of ethics, at least) unreflectively envisioned as part of any routine preparation to wage or defend against cyber war are aimed at civilians, and that their use would cause widespread destruction of lives and property, and otherwise inflict surprisingly massive and terrible suffering among the civilian population of the target state. Such cyber strategy is thus, he argues, inherently a violation of LOAC.…”

Section: Ethics and Cyber Conflictmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ethics and Cyber Conflict: A Response toJME12:1 (2013)

Lucas

2014

Journal of Military Ethics

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This article responds to several recent moral (as contrasted with legal) evaluations of cyber conflict appearing during the past several years. The principal (but not exclusive) focus is on articles recently published in this journal. Including those collected in a recent special issue of JME (12:1/ January 2013), guest edited by Bradley J. Strawser. The author distinguishes moral from legal issues in cyber conflict under current international law, and examines claims (like those of cyber expert, Randall Dipert) that neither international law nor just war tradition is any longer sufficient to govern the utterly unique objects and events taking place within a peculiar sort of domain that knows no boundaries, and where conventional constraints (like transparency and accountability) are wholly absent. Other issues covered include recent cyber conflicts, and whether the sort of harm suffered there, or likely to be inflicted during a broader cyberattack (including that resulting from long-term espionage and sabotage) would ever justify the use of conventional force in retaliation. While the JME special issue is not found to break any substantially new ground, taken in a wider context it charts the substantial progress that ethicists, moral philosophers and political theorists have made in catching up with the substantial legal analysis that have attended the advent of serious acts of malfeasance in the cyber domain during the past decade.

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“…A decoy can also be equipped with more detailed monitoring of its usage that would not be possible for most sites, and should use honeypot technology to implement attack resilience and intelligence-gathering capabilities that are not easily disabled. Decoys do not generally raise ethical concerns because they are passive, but guidelines should be followed in their use (Rowe, 2010) since decoys are also used by phishers.…”

Section: Network Monitoring For Cyberweaponsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They seem to require fewer resources to mount since their delivery can be accomplished in small payloads such as malicious devices or packets that can be primarily delivered through existing infrastructure such as the Internet. They also seem "cleaner" than conventional weapons in that their damage is primarily to data and data can be repaired, although they are difficult to control and usually entail actions close to perfidy, something outlawed by the laws of war (Rowe, 2010). Cyberweapons can be developed with modest technological infrastructure, even…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Challenges in Monitoring Cyberarms Compliance

Rowe

Garfinkel

Beverly

et al. 2011

International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism

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A cyberweapon can be as dangerous as any weapon. Fortunately, recent technology now provides some tools for cyberweapons control. Digital forensics can be done on computers seized during or after hostilities. Cyberweapons differ significantly from other software, especially during their development, and recent advances in summarizing the contents of storage media can locate possible cyberweapons quickly. In addition, use of cyberweapons can be distinguished from the usual malicious Internet traffic by being aimed at targets associated with political, social, and cultural issues that are often known well in advance, and we can monitor those targets. Cyberweapons are relatively unreliable compared to other kinds of weapons because they depend on flaws in software, and flaws can get fixed; cyberweapons therefore require considerable testing, preferably against live targets, and this testing may be observable. So international "cyberarms agreements" could provide for forensics on cyberweapons and usage monitoring. Agreements can also encourage cyberweapons use to be more responsible by stipulating attribution and reversibility. We conclude with a discussion of the kinds of international agreements that are desirable, and examine the recent increasing interest of the United States government in such agreements.

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The Ethics of Cyberweapons in Warfare

Cited by 19 publications

References 23 publications

Other-Than-Internet (Oti) Cyberwarfare: Challenges for Ethics, Law, and Policy

Other-Than-Internet (Oti) Cyberwarfare: Challenges for Ethics, Law, and Policy

Ethics and Cyber Conflict: A Response toJME12:1 (2013)

Challenges in Monitoring Cyberarms Compliance

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