The Ethics of Belief

Marušić, Berislav

doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00368.x

Cited by 17 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…According to evidentialism, only evidence is relevant. 4 Among the traditional pragmatists, one can cite Pascal (1670), James (1896), Leary (2017, ms), Marušić (2011), Reisner (2008 or Rinard (2015Rinard ( , 2019 Schleifer-McCormick (2015).…”

Section: Evidentialism About Rationalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There is disagreement among the proponents of this view. Pluralists, such as Marušić (2011) or Reisner (2008Reisner ( , 2009, claim that practical and epistemic reasons compete with one another to determine a general verdict about which doxastic attitude we should have. 11 Both kind of reasons are normative reasons for or 10 Among practical reasons there are also moral reasons.…”

Section: Traditional Pragmatismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Two Shapes of Pragmatism

Mudry

2021

KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy

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The ethics of belief is concerned with the question of what we should believe. According to evidentialism, what one should believe is determined by evidence only. Pragmatism claims that practical considerations too can be relevant. But pragmatism comes in two shapes. According to a more traditional version, practical considerations can provide practical reasons for or against belief. According to a new brand of pragmatism, pragmatic encroachment, practical considerations can affect positive epistemic status, such as epistemic rationality or knowledge. In the literature, the distinction between the two versions of pragmatism is not always made. If it is mentioned, it is quickly put aside. Sometimes, it is simply overlooked. As evidentialists face two distinct pragmatist challenges, they must get clearer on the distinction. But it matters for pragmatists too. As I see it, if one accepts one version of pragmatism, one should reject the other. This paper’s goals are to get clearer on the distinction and argue that both pragmatisms are independent. Accepting one version does not commit one to accept the other. Moreover, even if both pragmatisms tend to be neutral toward one another, I will argue that traditional pragmatism has good reasons to reject pragmatic encroachment and vice versa.

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Section: Evidentialism About Rationalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Traditional Pragmatismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Two Shapes of Pragmatism

Mudry

2021

KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy

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“…See Marušic( 2011). And as Kathryn Pogin reminded me, paradigmatically epistemically irrational beliefs -certain kinds of delusions, for instance -may be critical survival tactics for sufferers of trauma.…”

Section: Justificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 35 This is not uncontroversial; one source of dissent is the observation that beliefs are sometimes useful in ways having nothing to do with whether they amount to knowledge; for example, it can be pragmatically useful to believe, contrary the evidence, that one will succeed at a difficult task. See Marušić (2011). And as Kathryn Pogin reminded me, paradigmatically epistemically irrational beliefs – certain kinds of delusions, for instance – may be critical survival tactics for sufferers of trauma.…”

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confidence: 99%

Basic Knowledge First

Ichikawa¹

2017

Episteme

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An inuential twenty-rst century philosophical project posits a central role for knowledge: knowledge is more fundamental than epistemic states like belief and justication. So-called "knowledge rst" theorists nd support for this thought in identifying central theoretical roles for knowledge. I argue that a similar methodology supports a privileged role for a more specic category of basic knowledge. Some of the roles that knowledge rst theorists have posited for knowledge generally are better suited for basic knowledge.

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“…The origin of the contemporary debate comes from Clifford () and James (). For a survey of the topic, see Chignell (), Marusic (), and Reisner (forthcoming). …”

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confidence: 99%

Pragmatic encroachment in epistemology

Kim

2017

Philosophy Compass

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Epistemology orthodoxy is a purist one in the sense that it separates out the epistemic from the practical. What counts as evidence is independent of what we care about. Which beliefs count as justified and which count as knowledge are independent of our practical concerns. In recent years, many epistemologists have abandoned such purist views and embraced varying degrees of pragmatic encroachment on the epistemic. I survey a variety of these views and explore the main arguments that proponents of pragmatic encroachment have offered in addition to the main criticisms of the pragmatic approach. | INTRODUCTIONAccording to philosophical lore, epistemological orthodoxy is a purist epistemology in which epistemic concepts are characterized to be pure and free from practical concerns. On this purist view, what counts as knowledge, for example, is independent of what we care about, and what is good or bad for us is independent of what we have evidence to believe or accept. So one is a purist to the extent that one believes that the epistemic realm is independent of the practical realm and that our epistemic concepts are independent from our practical ones. 1In recent years, a number of challenges have been posed against purism from proponents of pragmatic encroachment, who adhere to the slogan that the practical encroaches on the epistemic. 2 Let us call any view that adheres to this slogan pragmatic. Since proponents of pragmatic encroachment represent a variety of philosophical approaches and views, the slogan is purposely ambiguous, open to a variety of interpretations and applications. I shall, however, begin our discussion by focusing on one specific interpretation. Once we have done so, we can then raise questions about how we have interpreted the slogan and explore alternatives that widen and/or change the scope of the slogan's application. I will do so by offering a taxonomy of pragmatic views in section 4.We start by specifying what we mean by "the practical" by appealing to a demarcation of practical from nonpractical factors that corresponds with the demarcation between non-truth-relevant and truth-relevant factors.Relative to some proposition p, a factor is truth-relevant just in case it affects the likelihood that p is true or false.So anything that raises or lowers the objective or subjective probability that p counts as truth-relevant. 3 For example, relative to the proposition that it will rain today, any proposition q (e.g., that there are clouds in the sky) such that the conditional probability that it will rain today given q is not equal to the unconditional probability that it will rain today will count as truth-relevant. On this initial interpretation, practical factors are just nontruthrelevant factors. 4Next, since knowledge is often taken as the central object of theoretical concern for epistemology, the most widely discussed question about pragmatic encroachment is the question of whether or not practical factors are

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The Ethics of Belief

Cited by 17 publications

References 43 publications

Two Shapes of Pragmatism

Two Shapes of Pragmatism

Basic Knowledge First

Pragmatic encroachment in epistemology

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