The Eternity Solution to the Problem of Human Freedom and Divine Foreknowledge

Rota, Michael

doi:10.24204/ejpr.v2i1.359

Cited by 10 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…This is a paraphrase of Rota (2010), 184: ‘If a human action A explains (at least in part) why (B) God believes something, and God's believing that something in turn explains (at least in part) why God causes an earlier event C to occur, then C cannot explain (even in part) the occurrence of A.’…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The freedom of Christ and explanatory priority

Pawl¹

2013

Rel. Stud.

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Call the claim, common to many in the Christian intellectual tradition, that Christ, in virtue of his created human intellect, had certain, infallible, exhaustive foreknowledge the Foreknowledge Thesis. Now consider what I will call the Conditional: if the Foreknowledge Thesis is true, then Christ's created human will was not free. In so far as many, perhaps all, of the people who affirm the Foreknowledge Thesis also wish to affirm the freedom of Christ's human will, the truth of the Conditional would be most unwelcome to them. I consider an argument in support of the Conditional; I argue that it is not successful. (2014) 50, 157-173 According to Conciliar Christology, there was (and is) one person, Jesus Christ, the Second Person of the Holy Trinity, who had (and has) two complete and distinct naturesone fully human nature, and the one and only divine natureand that each of these natures had (and has) its own will and principle of action. Christ, then, had two distinct wills and two distinct intellects. This is an article about the interrelations between those wills and intellects.  I will assume, for the remainder of this article, the truth of Conciliar Christology, and ask whether this assumption, together with the additional assumption that Christ had exhaustive foreknowledge via his human intellect of all that would come to pass, entails that the human will of Christ was not free. I provide an argument that Jesus Christ was not free in his human will, then show this argument to be unsound.  Religious Studies

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Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…23.But see Rota's (2010), 182–184 ingenious Book of Life example for potential problems with Christ's using his knowledge of what he will do to decide what to do.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The freedom of Christ and explanatory priority

Pawl¹

2013

Rel. Stud.

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“…Second, consider divine timelessness. Specifically, I am thinking of versions of divine timelessness which also affirm that God became incarnate in the past, and that God's past beliefs are explained by God's timeless beliefs (e.g., Rota 2010). On this sort of picture, Jones's undetermined act X at T2 explains God's timeless belief that Jones does X at T2, and God's timeless belief that Jones does X at T2 explains the incarnate God's past infallible belief that Jones will do X at T2.…”

Section: The Indirect Response Presentedmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Indirect Response To The Foreknowledge Argument

Byerly

2017

EJPR

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“…44See also: Rowe (1978: 158), Mavrodes (1984: 144‐5), Plantinga (1986), Talbott (1986: 463), Reichenbach (1987: 91), Wainwright (1988: 23), Yandell (1999: 336), Murray and Rea (2008: 52‐4), Merricks (2009), Rota (2010: 168), McCall (2011: 504‐5), Westphal (2011: 249), Swenson (2016: 663‐4), and Reichenbach (2017: 69‐70).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…5252See, for example, Swinburne (1977: 169), Kenny (1979: 56), Fredosso (1983: 265), Brown (1985; 85), Plantinga (1986: 258), Craig (1987: 82), Wainwright (1988: 23), Hasker (1989: 71‐2), Zagzebski (1991: 99), Swinburne (1994: 132), Hill (2005: 97), Merricks (2009: 54), Rota (2010: 174), Byerly (2015: 127), Swenson (2016: 663), Reichenbach (2017: 68), and Fischer (2017: 99). Todd and Fischer (2015) do not even mention the causal account in their survey of different kinds of dependence.…”

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confidence: 99%

Freedom, foreknowledge, and dependence

Wasserman

2019

Nous

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The idea that some of God's past beliefs depend on our future actions has a long history, going back to Origen in the third century CE. However, it is not always clear what this idea amounts to, since it is not always clear what kind of dependence is at issue. This paper surveys five different interpretations of dependence and, in each case, considers the implications for the debate over theological fatalism. Along the way, we discuss a number of related issues, including the nature of explanation, the scope of metaphysical grounding, and the possibility of backward causation.

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The Eternity Solution to the Problem of Human Freedom and Divine Foreknowledge

Cited by 10 publications

References 1 publication

The freedom of Christ and explanatory priority

The freedom of Christ and explanatory priority

The Indirect Response To The Foreknowledge Argument

Freedom, foreknowledge, and dependence

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