The essential moral self

Strohminger, Nina; Nichols, Shaun

doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2013.12.005

Cited by 483 publications

(344 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…Research has shown that using a foreign instead of the native language can sway our morals (e.g., Cipolletti, McFarlane, & Weissglass, 2016;Costa et al, 2014;Geipel, Hadjichristidis, & Surian, 2015a, 2015b). This finding is in stark opposition with the widely held belief that our morals define who we are (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014, 2015, and implies that foreign language use might be shaping international policymaking.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 64%

Foreign language affects the contribution of intentions and outcomes to moral judgment

2016

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We examine whether the use of a foreign language, as opposed to the native language, influences the relative weight intentions versus outcomes carry in moral evaluations. In Study 1, participants were presented with actions that had positive outcomes but were motivated by dubious intentions, while in Study 2 with actions that had negative outcomes but were motivated by positive intentions.Participants received the materials either in their native or a foreign language. Foreign language prompted more positive moral evaluations in Study 1 and less positive evaluations in Study 2.These results show that foreign language reduces the relative weight placed on intentions versus outcomes. We discuss several theoretical accounts that are consistent with the results such as that foreign language attenuates emotions (triggered by intentions) or it depletes cognitive resources.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 64%

Foreign language affects the contribution of intentions and outcomes to moral judgment

2016

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“…Similar studies (e.g., Goodwin et al, 2014;Strohminger & Nichols, 2014) revealed medium-tolarge effect sizes with comparable sample sizes, indicating we had appropriate power to detect an effect.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 76%

Morality’s Centrality to Liking, Respecting, and Understanding Others

Hartley

Furr

Helzer³

et al. 2016

Social Psychological and Personality Science

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We examine morality's relationship to three distinct dimensions of social perception: liking, respecting, and knowing a person. Participants completed two independent tasks. First, they rated acquaintances' morality, competence, and sociability, and how much they liked, respected, and knew those acquaintances. In the second task, they rated a variety of moral and competence traits on their importance to liking, respecting, and knowing a person. Several findings emerged. First, morality was the most important factor to liking, respecting, and knowing a person but relatively more important to liking and respecting than to knowing; this finding replicated across tasks. Second, certain moral traits were more important than others, especially honesty, compassion, and fairness. Third, these traits were considered important because they were seen as potentially beneficial to the social perceiver. This research reveals morality's centrality to evaluating and understanding others.

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“…Considerable evidence suggests that moral virtues are a particularly critical aspect of person impressions (Brambilla, Sacchi, Rusconi, Cherubini, & Yzerbyt, 2012;Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li, 2007;Goodwin et al, 2014;Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007;Strohminger & Nichols, 2014;van 't Wout & Sanfey, 2008;Willis & Todorov, 2006;Wojciszke, 2005;Wojciszke, Bazinska, et al, 1998). People rate traits such as honesty, loyalty, respectfulness, fairness, and kindness as among the most desirable that a person can possess (Goodwin et al, 2014), and such character traits strongly predict global impression formation (see Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011;Brambilla et al, 2012;Goodwin et al, 2014;Wojciszke, Bazinska, et al, 1998).…”

Section: Past Research On Moral Charactermentioning

confidence: 96%

When a Virtue is Not a Virtue: Conditional Virtues in Moral Evaluation

Piazza¹,

Goodwin²,

Rozin³

et al. 2014

Social Cognition

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four studies show that people distinguish between two sorts of moral virtues: core goodness traits that unconditionally enhance the morality of any agent, and value commitment traits that are conditionally good (i.e., that polarize the morality of good and bad agents). study 1 revealed that commitment traits (e.g., dedicated) amplify the badness of a bad agent (terrorist), whereas core goodness traits (e.g., kind) amplify the goodness of the bad agent. study 2 replicated these results while also showing that both commitment and core goodness traits enhance the perceived goodness of neutral and good agents. studies 2-4 established that commitment traits polarize moral evaluations by signaling agents' commitment to certain values, rather than their agency or effectiveness in pursuing those values. These results extend current understanding of the perceived structure of moral character.

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The essential moral self

Cited by 483 publications

References 41 publications

Foreign language affects the contribution of intentions and outcomes to moral judgment

Foreign language affects the contribution of intentions and outcomes to moral judgment

Morality’s Centrality to Liking, Respecting, and Understanding Others

When a Virtue is Not a Virtue: Conditional Virtues in Moral Evaluation

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