The Erotics of Knowing: A Neglected Contribution to Analytic Erotism

Tutter, Adele

doi:10.1177/0003065118783669

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Even Adlerian approaches [1][2][3], initially most reluctant to consider "love" feelings toward the analyst as anything but manifestations of an uncooperative attitude, and their reciprocation as anything but unprofessional, found that they were in fact common and inevitable, and might as well be made serviceable insofar as they could be not so much interpreted as redirected (into constructive "social feeling" in the patient's extra-analytical world). Recent literature, though still cautious, has increasingly admitted and embraced "the erotic" as key in analytic work [7,20,21,22,24,28,31,32], and for Lacanians, the dynamics of desire, far from eliminable, are the clinical currency [33,34]: both analyst and patient are viewed essentially as desiring agents, and it is precisely the tension thereby created that is the driving force of therapeutic action and change.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Feeling and Freedom: The Medical Model from a Moral Standpoint

Cruz¹

2022

IJP

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In 1958, G. E. M. Anscombe began her paper on modern moral philosophy by stating that moral philosophy had become impossible, and should be laid aside at present "until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking." In 1979, S. Cavell asserts that the difficulty with moral philosophy is that the "facts" upon which it operates are our relationships with one another, which are markedly different in kind from the facts of the physical sciences. Is there anything left, then, for modern moral philosophy to do, or have its issues been reduced to questions for psychology, or perhaps anthropology and sociology? Or shall we just study Aristotle? We are reminded of the criticism which Husserl leveled against the naturalistic sciences at the time when psychology and psychoanalysis (and sociology) were just earnestly beginning, namely that they have inherited a problem which enlightenment philosophy had tried, and failed, to solve. It is the problem of freedom, with its implications for rationality, moral agency, and intersubjectivity. This brief essay seeks to draw out the "antinomy" that continues in the conflict between scientific and humanistic approaches, despite the efforts of phenomenology and existentialism. The suggestion is that moral philosophy does have a province of its own, which contributions from both the transcendental tradition and the psychological studies equip it to address.

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