2010
DOI: 10.1108/10309611011060506
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The equity and efficiency of the Australian share market with respect to director trading

Abstract: Acknowledgments: We wish to thank Jim Psaros and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. AbstractThirteen percent of own-company trades by directors do not meet the ASX requirement of reporting within 5 business days, while seven percent are not reported within 14 business days as required by the Corporations Act. Such breaches of reporting regulations are particularly important given that directors tend to purchase (sell) shares when the price is low (high), thereby achieving abnormal returns. These abno… Show more

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Cited by 15 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…Another study by Uylangco et al (2010) also focuses on the Australian share market. It explores the extent to which company directors breach the ASX and Australian Corporations Act reporting requirements and whether directors earn abnormal profits by trading in own company stocks.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Another study by Uylangco et al (2010) also focuses on the Australian share market. It explores the extent to which company directors breach the ASX and Australian Corporations Act reporting requirements and whether directors earn abnormal profits by trading in own company stocks.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In terms of insider trades, prior research finds that insiders do appear to place, and profit from, trades based on superior information (for the US: Aboody and Lev, ; Ke et al ., ; Piotroski and Roulstone, ; Huddart et al ., ; Ravina and Sapienza, ; for Australia: Brown et al ., ; Chang and Chopra, ; Neill et al ., ; Uylangco et al ., ; Chang and Wee, ; Foley et al ., ). Limited evidence on the market reaction to trades generally finds a positive reaction to purchases and negative reaction to sales by insiders (for the US: Brochet, ; for the UK: Fidrmuc et al ., ; Brochet, )…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“… The evidence on director trades in Australia focuses on returns around the trade date, that is returns to the trading strategy, rather than the market reaction to the disclosure of the trade (Brown et al ., ; Chang and Chopra, ; Neill et al ., ; Uylangco et al ., ; Chang and Wee, ; Foley et al ., ). …”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In fact, prior US research casts doubt over legal insider trades as being informationally neutral (e.g. Seyhun, 1986;Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005;Huddart et al, 2007;Aktas et al, 2008;Griffin et al, 2014), with a growing body of research drawing similar conclusions within Australia (Brown et al, 2003;Hodgson and Van Praag, 2006;Uylangco et al, 2010;Katselas, 2018). Additionally, a recent study by Chang and Wee (2016) shows that the period immediately preceding periodic earnings announcements attract blackout periods stipulated within company-specific trading policies, which prevent otherwise profitable insider trading by directors.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%