The Equilibrium Mechanism of Interest Distribution in Farmland Transfer: Based on the Perspective of the Three-Party Game

Abstract

The purpose of the paper is to study how the interests of farmland transfer be distributed among the government, contractors, and farmland transferees. The process of the paper is to analyze the evolutionary stability strategies of the government, contractors, and farmland transferees by building a three-party evolutionary game model; in order to identify the equilibrium point of the three-party evolutionary game, an example of interest distribution in a village in Anhui Province is used to analyze and simulate the three-party evolutionary game. The conclusions of the paper are as follows: the combination of a one-party subsidy, transferring farmland, and grain production is the ideal equilibrium result in the three-party game; farmland transfer rent is the a crucial factor of interest balance among the three parties; only if the farmland transfer rental price is larger than the sum of the contractor’s self-farming incomes and subsidies and lower than the grain income of the transferee can the three parties realize the equilibrium of interest distribution. The suggestions of the paper are that the government should carry out the system of “retirement allowance” and transform “subsidy” to “allowance” to protect the interests of contractors, and the government should promote farmland transfer and encourage grain production by controlling the fluctuation range of farmland transfer rent.

Retracted: The Equilibrium Mechanism of Interest Distribution in Farmland Transfer: Based on the Perspective of the Three-Party Game

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