The epistemology of moral disagreement

Rowland, Richard

doi:10.1111/phc3.12398

Cited by 15 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 56 publications

(78 reference statements)

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“…The Argument from Moral Peer Disagreement was first introduced by Sarah McGrath in her seminal: "Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise" (2008). 6 Similar arguments have later 4 also been discussed by , Locke (2017), andRowland (2017). Here is a slightly modified version of McGrath's argument: 7 P1 If, in the face of disagreement about x, you have reason to believe that your opponent is an epistemic peer, then your belief about x does not amount to knowledge.…”

Section: The Argument From Moral Peer Disagreementmentioning

confidence: 84%

Moral Peer Disagreement and the Limits of Higher-Order Evidence

Tiozzo¹

2020

Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology

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This paper argues that the "Argument from Moral Peer Disagreement" fails to make a case for widespread moral skepticism. The main reason for this is that the argument rests on a too strong assumption about the normative significance of peer disagreement (and higherorder evidence more generally). In order to demonstrate this, I distinguish two competing ways in which one might explain higher-order defeat. According to what I call the "Objective Defeat Explanation" it is the mere possession of higher-order evidence that explains defeat. I argue that this type of explanation is problematic and that it at best collapses into another explanation I call the "Subjective Defeat Explanation". According to this view, it is coming to believe that one's belief fails to be rational that explains defeat. Then I go on to argue that the Subjective Defeat Explanation is able to provide a straightforward explanation of higher-order defeat but that it entails that peer disagreement (and higher-order evidence more generally) only contingently gives rise to defeat, and importantly, that the condition it is contingent upon is very often not satisfied when it comes to moral peer disagreement specifically. As a result, it appears that moral knowledge is seldom threatened by moral peer disagreement.

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Section: The Argument From Moral Peer Disagreementmentioning

confidence: 84%

Moral Peer Disagreement and the Limits of Higher-Order Evidence

Tiozzo¹

2020

Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology

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“…Disagreements of a similar sort is discussed by RichardRowland (2017a) andKieran Setiya (2012). Setiya writes about moral monsters, i.e.…”

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confidence: 76%

Moral Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence

Kappel

Andersen

2019

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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This paper sketches a general account of how to respond in an epistemically rational way to moral disagreement. Roughly, the account states that when two parties, A and B, disagree as to whether p, A says p while B says not-p, this is higher-order evidence that A has made a cognitive error on the first-order level of reasoning in coming to believe that p (and likewise for B with respect to not-p). If such higherorder evidence is not defeated, then one rationally ought to reduce one's confidence with respect to the proposition in question. We term this the higher-order evidence account (the HOE account), and present it as superior to what we might call standard conciliationism, which holds that when agents A and B disagree about p, and are (known) epistemic peers, they should both suspend judgement about p or adjust their confidence towards the mean of A and B's prior credences in p. Many have suspected that standard conciliationism is implausible and may have skeptical implications. After presenting the HOE account, we put it to work by applying it to # We have presented this material at workshops in London, Lisbon, and Copenhagen. Thanks to audiences there for helpful comments, in particular Julien Dutant, Alexander Heape and participants in LVU18, Lisbon. 2 a range of cases of moral disagreement, including those that have featured in recent debates assuming standard conciliationism. We show that the HOE account support reasonable, non-skeptical verdicts in a range of cases. Note that this is a paper on moral disagreement, not on the HOE account, thus the account is merely stated here, while defended more fully elsewhere. 1

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“…Several critics have pointed out in response to Elga that the disputants he has in mind do not live in different moral worlds (Rowland 2017). Even those on opposing sides of bitter disputes about abortion, say, agree with one another in a great deal of their moral judgements, some shared more or less universally (lying is wrong), some accepted only at some places and at some times (slavery is wrong; animal suffering counts morally).…”

Section: Partisan Peerhoodmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Surprising Truth About Disagreement

Levy

2020

Acta Anal

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Conciliationism—the thesis that when epistemic peers discover that they disagree about a proposition, both should reduce their confidence—faces a major objection: it seems to require us to significantly reduce our confidence in our central moral and political commitments. In this paper, I develop a typology of disagreement cases and a diagnosis of the source and force of the pressure to conciliate. Building on Vavova’s work, I argue that ordinary and extreme disagreements are surprising, and for this reason, they carry information about the likelihood of error. But deep disagreement is not surprising at all, and token deep disagreements do not put pressure on us to conciliate. However, a pattern of deep disagreements points to a different concern: not the problem of disagreement but the problem of irrelevant influences. Deep disagreement constitutes some pressure to examine the foundations from which we reason, rather than to conciliate on our central moral and political claims.

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The epistemology of moral disagreement

Cited by 15 publications

References 56 publications

Moral Peer Disagreement and the Limits of Higher-Order Evidence

Moral Peer Disagreement and the Limits of Higher-Order Evidence

Moral Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence

The Surprising Truth About Disagreement

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