The Epistemic View of Subjectivity

Sturgeon, Scott

doi:10.2307/2940751

Cited by 80 publications

(29 citation statements)

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“…It does not rely on phenomenal concepts having a special mode of presentation or canonical evidence for their application (e.g. Sturgeon, 1994). Indeed, the definition is consistent with the rejection of Fregean sense for concepts.…”

Section: (Pfc) Concept C Is a Physical-functional Conceptmentioning

confidence: 66%

Using phenomenal concepts to explain away the intuition of contingency

Shea

2013

Philosophical Psychology

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Humans can think about their conscious experiences using a special class of 'phenomenal' concepts. Psycho-physical identity statements formulated using phenomenal concepts appear to be contingent. Kripke argued that this intuited contingency could not be explained away, in contrast to ordinary theoretical identities where it can. If the contingency is real, property dualism follows.Physicalists have attempted to answer this challenge by pointing to special features of phenomenal concepts that explain the intuition of contingency. However no physicalist account of their distinguishing features has proven to be satisfactory.Leading accounts rely on there being a phenomenological difference between tokening a physical-functional concept and tokening a phenomenal concept. This paper shows that existing psychological data undermine that claim. The paper goes on to suggest that the recalcitrance of the intuition of contingency may instead by explained by the limited means people typically have for applying their phenomenal concepts. Ways of testing that suggestion empirically are proposed.

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Section: (Pfc) Concept C Is a Physical-functional Conceptmentioning

confidence: 66%

Using phenomenal concepts to explain away the intuition of contingency

Shea

2013

Philosophical Psychology

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“…1 and appendix). For doubts about the argument, see, e.g., Sturgeon (1998). One should note that the present argument is distinct from the more traditional consideration that a non-material mind would be too different from matter to have any causal relations with it.…”

Section: Preliminariesmentioning

confidence: 91%

Is the mystery an illusion? Papineau on the problem of consciousness

Sundström

2007

Synthese

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A number of philosophers have recently argued that (i) consciousness properties are identical with some set of physical or functional properties and that (ii) we can explain away the frequently felt puzzlement about this claim as a delusion or confusion generated by our different ways of apprehending or thinking about consciousness. This paper examines David Papineau's influential version of this view. According to Papineau, the difference between our "phenomenal" and "material" concepts of consciousness produces an instinctive but erroneous intuition that these concepts can't co-refer. I claim that this account fails. To begin with, it is arguable that we are mystified about physicalism even when the account predicts that we shouldn't be. Further, and worse, the account predicts that an "intuition of distinctness" will arise in cases where it clearly does not. In conclusion, I make some remarks on the prospects for, constraints on, and (physicalist) alternatives to, a successful defence of the claim (ii).

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“…Il reste désormais limité aux informations passées, coupé des trois étapes essentielles à l'acquisition de connaissances nouvelles : la perception, l'apprentissage et la mémo-risation. Ce processus reste fondamental pour étudier l'utilisation des concepts dans des tâches complexes et abstraites, car il est impossible de décrire l'expérience subjective en des termes qui ne soient pas, eux aussi, subjectifs (Sturgeon, 1994). L'autodéfinition du docteur Munch s'effectue, entre autres, à partir de références à la prime enfance («J'ai été nourri au sein.…”

Section: Adieu Docteur Munch : La Quête D'une Impossible Identitéunclassified

Rupture et fragments dans le théâtre de René-Daniel Dubois

Sarrasin

2010

annuaire

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Depuis quelques années, le théâtre québécois tend à adopter certaines caractéristiques, telles que l’hybridation des genres et la fragmentation, une dynamique chaotique et morcelée que les oeuvres de René-Daniel Dubois partagent et, tout à la fois, contribuent à définir. Dans le présent article, l’auteur analyse deux de ses pièces — Adieu, docteur Münch et Le troisième fils du professeur Yourolov — afin de montrer, à partir du point de vue cognitif, de quelle manière s’élabore cette esthétique. La mémoire et la subjectivité des personnages soulignent autant l’incertitude de leur existence que leur quête d’identité, ce qui se manifeste par la confusion et la perte des points de repère spatio-temporels. En relation avec la réception théâtrale, cette diffraction du sens permet également de multiplier les modalités d’interprétation, conséquence particulière de cet éclatement de la signification.In the last few years, québécois theatre has tended to adopt certain characteristics, such as hybridization of genres and fragmentation, as well somewhat chaotic dynamics that the plays of Rene-Daniel Dubois contribute to define. This article analyzes two of his plays—Adieu, docteur Münch and Le troisième fils du professeur Yourolov—in order to show, from a cognitive point of view, how these esthetics appear. The characters' memory and subjectivity underline the uncertainty of their existence as much as their search for identity, which is reflected by their confusion and the loss of space-time reference points. In relation to theatrical reception, this diffraction of meaning also makes it possible to multiply the methods of interpretation

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The Epistemic View of Subjectivity

Cited by 80 publications

References 0 publications

Using phenomenal concepts to explain away the intuition of contingency

Using phenomenal concepts to explain away the intuition of contingency

Is the mystery an illusion? Papineau on the problem of consciousness

Rupture et fragments dans le théâtre de René-Daniel Dubois

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