The epistemic significance of perceptual learning

Chudnoff, Elijah

doi:10.1080/0020174x.2017.1357496

Cited by 35 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…For such an account, cf. Chudnoff ( 2018 ). In what follows, however, I will briefly elaborate on why I reject P1.…”

Section: A Sellarsian-style Anti-foundationalist Criticism Of Pcejmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Phenomenological approaches have been introduced and defended particularly with regard to perceptual experiences (cf., e.g., Berghofer 2020a ; Chudnoff 2018 ; Churchnoff 2013 ) and mathematical intuitions (cf., e.g., Berghofer 2020c ; Chudnoff 2013 , 2020 ). However, detailed phenomenological descriptions of and phenomenological approaches to the kind of experiences that are relevant in (meta-)ethics are still largely missing in the contemporary analytic literature.…”

Section: Introducing the Phenomenological Approach To Experiential Jumentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evaluative experiences: the epistemological significance of moral phenomenology

Berghofer

2021

Synthese

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Recently, a number of phenomenological approaches to experiential justification emerged according to which an experience's justificatory force is grounded in the experience’s distinctive phenomenology. The basic idea is that certain experiences exhibit a presentive phenomenology and that they are a source of immediate justification precisely by virtue of their presentive phenomenology. Such phenomenological approaches usually focus on perceptual experiences and mathematical intuitions. In this paper, I aim at a phenomenological approach to ethical experiences. I shall show that we need to make a distinction between evaluative experiences directed at concrete cases and ethical intuitions directed at general principles. The focus will be on evaluative experiences. I argue that evaluative experiences constitute a sui generis type of experience that gain their justificatory force by virtue of their presentive evaluative phenomenology. In Sect. 1, I introduce and motivate the phenomenological idea that certain experiences exhibit a justification-conferring phenomenology. In Sect. 4, I apply this idea to morally evaluative experiences. In Sect. 5, I suggest that certain epistemic intuitions should be considered epistemically evaluative experiences and I outline a strong parallelism between ethics and epistemology.

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“…For such an account, cf. Chudnoff ( 2018 ). In what follows, however, I will briefly elaborate on why I reject P1.…”

Section: A Sellarsian-style Anti-foundationalist Criticism Of Pcejmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introducing the Phenomenological Approach To Experiential Jumentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluative experiences: the epistemological significance of moral phenomenology

Berghofer

2021

Synthese

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“…Perceptual learning has emerged as an alternate way of explaining the sort of learning that takes place from novice to expert (Ransom 2020; Connolly 2019; Brogaard and Gatzia 2018; Chomanski and Chudnoff 2018; Chudnoff 2018; Vaassen 2016). It is an enduring functional change in the perceptual system that results in a long-term change in the contents of our perceptual experience (Goldstone 1998; Gibson and Gibson 1955).…”

Section: Perceptual Expertise and Perceptual Learningmentioning

confidence: 99%

Expert Knowledge by Perception

Ransom¹

2020

Philosophy

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AbstractDoes the scope of beliefs that people can form on the basis of perception remain fixed, or can it be amplified with learning? The answer to this question is important for our understanding of why and when we ought to trust experts, and also for assessing the plausibility of epistemic foundationalism. The empirical study of perceptual expertise suggests that experts can indeed enrich their perceptual experiences through learning. Yet this does not settle the epistemic status of their beliefs. One might hold that the background knowledge of experts is the cause of their enriched perceptual experience – what is known as cognitive permeation – and so their subsequent beliefs are only mediately justified because they are epistemically dependent on this background knowledge. I argue against this view. Perceptual expertise is not the result of cognitive permeation but is rather the result of perceptual learning, and perceptual learning does not involve cognition in a way that entails cognitive permeation. Perceptual expertise thus provides a means of widening the scope of the immediately justified beliefs that experts can form.

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“…While it is beyond doubt that perceptual learning is a philosophically interesting phenomenon with crucial implications for philosophy of mind, it is only very recently that researchers have begun to investigate whether we can draw genuinely epistemological lessons from this (cf. Brogaard and Gatzia 2017;Chudnoff 2017;Siegel 2017;Vaassen 2016). Does perceptual learning tell us something about experiential justification?…”

Section: Exemplifying the Relevance Of Experimental Psychology 3: Permentioning

confidence: 99%

Phenomenology and Experimental Psychology: On the Prospects and Limitations of Experimental Research for a Phenomenological Epistemology

Berghofer

2020

Journal of Transcendental Philosophy

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Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is first and foremost a science of the structures of consciousness. Since it is intended to yield eidetic, i. e., a priori insights, it is often assumed that transcendental phenomenology and the natural sciences are totally detached from each other such that phenomenological investigations cannot possibly benefit from empirical evidence. The aim of this paper is to show that a beneficial relationship is possible. To be more precise, I will show how Husserl’s a priori investigations on consciousness can be supplemented by research in experimental psychology in order to tackle fundamental questions in epistemology. Our result will be a phenomenological conception of experiential justification that is in accordance with and supported by empirical phenomena such as perceptual learning and the phenomenon of blindsight. Finally, I shall shed light on the systematic limits of empirical research.

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The epistemic significance of perceptual learning

Cited by 35 publications

References 33 publications

Evaluative experiences: the epistemological significance of moral phenomenology

Evaluative experiences: the epistemological significance of moral phenomenology

Expert Knowledge by Perception

Phenomenology and Experimental Psychology: On the Prospects and Limitations of Experimental Research for a Phenomenological Epistemology

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