The Epistemic Significance of #MeToo

Abstract

In part I of this paper, I argue that #MeToo testimony increases epistemic value for the survivor qua hearer when experiences like hers are represented by others; for society at large when false but dominant narratives about sexual violence and sexual harassment against women are challenged and replaced with true stories; and for the survivor qua teller when her true story is believed. In part II, I argue that the epistemic significance of #MeToo testimony compels us to consider the tremendous and often unappreciated costs to the individual tellers, and the increased credibility they are owed in virtue thereof.

#MeToo and testimonial injustice: An investigation of moral and conceptual knowledge

“…Furthermore, Freedman argues that the marginalized social position of the victim plays a significant role in whether they are believed or not. According to Freedman, ‘part of what it means to be marginalized is to lack the power and influence to tell one’s own story’ (2020, 3) and to risk one’s health and safety if one does. This points to a direct relation between testimonial injustice and what Fricker coined ‘hermeneutical injustice’, the injustice ‘of having some significant area of one’s social experience obscured from collective understanding owing to a structural identity prejudice in the collective hermeneutical resource’ (Fricker 2007, 155).…”

“…(1987, 82)This strategy provides an alternative to the testimonial disbelief that many victims have to face when they report their experiences of sexual violence; it is the motivator for the #MeToo-movement. As Freedman shows, #MeToo has epistemic value for victims of sexual violence by contextualizing the individual and harmful experience, for society at large by challenging dominant but distorted narratives about sexual violence (Freedman 2020, 2).…”

“…3.Freedman provides a short explanation of how empathy plays a role in the social and cultural change that testimony can bring about, but does not go into detail (2020, 13–4). Both Brynjarsdóttir (2021) and Miller (2019) also focus on epistemic aspects of #MeToo; Miller argues for the complex ways in which speaking out in the name of #MeToo is a refusal against the pressured silence that victims of sexual violence are forced into, Brynjarsdóttir argues that the resistance that the #MeToo movement itself meets should be understood as epistemic injustice.…”

“…According to Freedman, testifiers of sexual violence endure tremendous costs including the costs of being disbelieved, shamed and deemed irrational. Thus, it follows that hearers of reports of sexual violence have more than the usual reasons to believe the testifier (Freedman 2020, part II). I should note that this is also the main reason why I do not address the problem that some individuals lie about their experiences; while, of course, this is not impossible, it is more than unlikely.…”

Rethinking the wrong of rape1

“…This routine undermining of rape victims’ credibility epitomizes Fricker's (2007) central case of identity‐prejudicial credibility deficit. These victims end up suffering not just the distinctive primary harm of testimonial injustice, but considerable secondary harms as well (see Freedman, 2020, on this point). And note, credibility is not something that is evenly apportioned among women.…”