Abstract:The best extant statement of the epistemic regress problem makes assumptions that are too strong. An improved version assumes only that that reasons require support, that no proposition is supported only by endless regresses of reasons, and that some proposition is supported. These assumptions are individually plausible but jointly inconsistent. Attempts to explain support by means of unconceptualized sensations, contextually immunized propositions, endless regresses, and holistic coherence all require either … Show more
“…For example, the argument can be generalized so that it applies to varieties of coherentism on which what needs to be coherent is S's system of beliefs and perceptual experiences. 46 44 For discussion of the "regress problem" and foundationalism, social contextualism, infinitism, and coherentism, and for references, see Cling (2008). It might be best to allow for varieties of coherentism on which some justification is noninferential, and thus on which it is not required for justification that (CCI) be satisfied.…”
I develop a probabilistic account of coherence, and argue that at least in certain respects it is preferable to (at least some of) the main extant probabilistic accounts of coherence: (i) Igor Douven and Wouter Meijs's account, (ii) Branden Fitelson's account, (iii) Erik Olsson's account, and (iv) Tomoji Shogenji's account. Further, I relate the account to an important, but little discussed, problem for standard varieties of coherentism, viz., the "Problem of Justified Inconsistent Beliefs."
“…For example, the argument can be generalized so that it applies to varieties of coherentism on which what needs to be coherent is S's system of beliefs and perceptual experiences. 46 44 For discussion of the "regress problem" and foundationalism, social contextualism, infinitism, and coherentism, and for references, see Cling (2008). It might be best to allow for varieties of coherentism on which some justification is noninferential, and thus on which it is not required for justification that (CCI) be satisfied.…”
I develop a probabilistic account of coherence, and argue that at least in certain respects it is preferable to (at least some of) the main extant probabilistic accounts of coherence: (i) Igor Douven and Wouter Meijs's account, (ii) Branden Fitelson's account, (iii) Erik Olsson's account, and (iv) Tomoji Shogenji's account. Further, I relate the account to an important, but little discussed, problem for standard varieties of coherentism, viz., the "Problem of Justified Inconsistent Beliefs."
“…There is a regress problem for any kind of evidence‐providing reason when these jointly inconsistent propositions are independently plausible statements about that kind of reason:(1E) It is possible that there is a P 1 and a P 2 such that P 2 supports P 1 (Cling , 404–5) …”
Section: The Problemsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(3E) Necessarily, if it is necessary that for all P 1 and P 2 , P 2 supports P 1 only if P 1 is the first component of a sequence of propositions 〈P 1 , P 2 , … 〉 each component of which has a successor that supports it, then it is not possible that there is a P 1 and a P 2 such that P 2 supports P 1 (Cling , 404–5)…”
There are important similarities between the epistemic regress problem and the problem of the criterion. Each turns on plausible principles stating that epistemic reasons must be supported by epistemic reasons but that having reasons is impossible if that requires having endless regresses of reasons. These principles are incompatible with the possibility of reasons, so each problem is a paradox. Whether there can be an antiskeptical solution to these paradoxes depends upon the kinds of reasons that we need in order to attain our epistemic goals. This article explains the problems and considers the ways in which two different conceptions of human flourishing support the value of different kinds of reasons. One conception requires reasons that allow an easy solution to these paradoxes. The other—rational autonomy—requires reasons that depend upon endless regresses. So we cannot have the kinds of fully transparent reasons required for rational autonomy.
“…2 Direct realism and the epistemic regress problem Cling (2007) aptly summarizes the epistemic regress problem by characterizing it in terms of an inconsistent triad of propositions concerning epistemic support. (In Cling's terminology, an "S-ordered sequence" is a sequence of propositions every member of which is supported by its successor 4 ):…”
Both traditional and naturalistic epistemologists have long assumed that the examination of human psychology has no relevance to the prescriptive goal of traditional epistemology, that of providing first-person guidance in determining the truth. Contrary to both, I apply insights about the psychology of human perception and concept-formation to a very traditional epistemological project: the foundationalist approach to the epistemic regress problem. I argue that direct realism about perception can help solve the regress problem and support a foundationalist account of justification, but only if it is supplemented by an abstractionist theory of concept-formation, the view that it is possible to abstract concepts directly from the empirically given. Critics of direct realism like Laurence BonJour are correct that an account of direct perception by itself does not provide an adequate account of justification. However a direct realist account of perception can inform the needed theory of concept-formation, and leading critics of abstractionism like McDowell and Sellars, direct realists about perception themselves, fail to appreciate the ways in which their own views about perception help fill gaps in earlier accounts of abstractionism. Recognizing this undercuts both their objections to abstractionism and (therefore) their objections to foundationalism.
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