The Epistemic Ambitions of the Criminal Trial: Truth, Proof, and Rights

Abstract

This paper sets out to examine the epistemic ambitions of the criminal trial. It argues for an understanding of criminal evidence and proof which is inextricably connected to the demands of justified punishment and fair trials in the rule of law. Criminal trials must prioritise the individual rights of the accused, but they also define more generally the manner in which those subject to the law are to be treated in order to engender public acceptance of the verdict. In this sense, it is sceptical of instrumental accounts of criminal adjudication and, in particular, of the feasibility of any sort of separation of outcome and process. It subscribes instead to the notion that (true) belief in the necessity of imposing punishment in the rule of law will only be warranted if it is based on appropriate reasons, understood as reasons which are formed following a distinct type of process.

Reply to the Comments on Epistemic Ambitions of the Criminal Trial: Truth, Proof and Rights

“…The aim(s) of criminal proceedings, the form that these proceedings should take and the role of proof of guilt in this enterprise is contested. This is well illustrated by the various positions taken by the four commentators on The Epistemic Ambitions of the Criminal Trial (Summers, 2023). For Antony Duff (2023, p. 159 The justification, the legitimacy, even (we might say) the truth of the verdict reached in a criminal trial is determined not just by the truth of the proposition it contains about the guilt of the accused person (in a guilty verdict, the proposition that he committed the offence with which he was charged), but by the procedure through which that verdict was reached It follows from this that in thinking about the purpose of criminal trials, outcome cannot be separated from process:…”

“…The state is under an obligation from fairness and equality to ensure that it does not impose on any individual a greater risk of harm (such as the harm of being wrongfully convicted or punished) than it imposes on other individuals (Summers, 2023, p. 265, drawing on Dworkin, 1985).…”

The Forensics in Criminal Proceedings: From Theory to Practice or How to Prevent Limitations

“…Moreover, the syllogism of in dubio pro reo, applied as a fundamental judgment of criminal proceedings in those cases in which there is no evi-dence enough to support the indictment act on the crime committed, is not equally assessed to the final decision made by the court of law. 23 Basically, there is no judgment to consider that a perpetrator could be exonerated by the criminal liability in cases in which the result of his/her own criminal behaviour would be the same if the legal provisions would have been respected. For this reason, the court of law has been invested with the defendant's request of appeal in cassation with the main reason that the offence is not incriminated by the criminal law in force which, in fact, directs to the impunity solution.…”

Truth, Proof, Rights and the Rule of Law in Criminal Adjudication

“…Año 2023 5 pp. 181-188 DOI: 10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i5.22838/ Summers (2022b) suggests that the equality dimension of the rule of law provides an alternative explanation for the need for a high standard of proof in criminal cases to the one more commonly given that it is a recognition of the fact that wrongful convictions are more problematic than wrongful acquittals. Within the distinctive context of criminal procedure in which the State imposes punishment, however, the need for a high standard of proof may also be seen as an obligation from fairness and equality to ensure that the State does not impose on any «individual a greater risk of harm (such as the harm of being wrongfully convicted and punished) than it imposes on other individuals» (p. 265), albeit that there may be some imprecision in defining what such a high standard entails (Ferrer Beltrán, 2021, p. 40).…”