The Enlightenment of Sympathy

Frazer, Michael L.

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195390667.001.0001

Cited by 155 publications

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“…We still inhabit a state that Michael Frazer describes as "lawless clannishness," where we can be secure inside our communities but find ourselves constantly under threat from the outside. 39 We trade war for peace by extending prevailing conventions or negotiating new ones among an increasing number of people who are now part of an enlarged circle of mutual sympathy and reciprocity. The conventions themselves deepen and become more stable and lawlike, as both the original participants and the new ones can grasp the long-term benefits of social coordination through rules.…”

Section: Hume On International Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hume’s Dynamic Coordination and International Law

Pavel

2020

Political Theory

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At the heart of the tension between state autonomy and international law is the question of whether states should willingly restrict their freedom of action for the sake of international security, human rights, trade, communication, and the environment. David Hume offers surprising insights to answer this question. He argues that the same interests in cooperation arise among individuals as well as states and that their interactions should be regulated by the same principles. Drawing on his model of dynamic coordination, I will reconstruct the Humean case for developing international law into a more robust legal system and also highlight the limitation of Hume’s account of justice for such a reconstructive project. Hume’s lessons are enduring; we must strengthen the essential features of international law that allow states and individuals to reap the benefits of its protections, such as nonoptional rules that articulate a moral minimum, courts with compulsory jurisdiction, and stronger mechanisms of enforcement.

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Section: Hume On International Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hume’s Dynamic Coordination and International Law

Pavel

2020

Political Theory

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“…A consensus emerged that reason and emotion, while different categories of the mind, can operate synergistically in productive action. It was recognized that human emotions such as love, pride, gratitude, and ambitiousness, if properly channeled and morally grounded, can contribute to human progress (Crocker, 1963;James, 1997;Frazer, 2010). There was in these times concern about insincerity of emotional expression (Rousseau, 1754(Rousseau, , 1762a(Rousseau, /1979) and a clear awareness that emotions can possess political intentionality.…”

Section: The Passions In Early Modernitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Alienation and Emotion: Hegel Versus Sentimentalism and Romanticism

TenHouten¹

2019

RES

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The structuralist and social-psychological perspectives on alienation are described, with attention to Seeman’s contention that the experience of alienation is based more on sentiment than on reason. The passions in early modernity are described, and the eighteenth-century moral sentimentalists Hume, Smith, and Kant are discussed. Romanticism is described as the first self-critique of modernity, as it opposed Enlightenment science, rationalism, and uniformitarianism; it is linked to interiorized emotionality and to diversitarianism. Romantic concepts of alienation include inhibition of natural sexuality, oppressive condition of work, and the loss of an imagined Golden Age before human alienation. Hegel’s Phenomenology outlines a four-stage mode of the undoing of social domination which has a narrative structure consistent with romantic story-telling, but was grounded not in romanticism but in Gnosticism and Lutheran dialectics. Hegel’s critique of sentimentalism and romantism is explored, with Hegel emerging as a dedicated anti-romantic who condemned the sophistry of Schlegel and Novalis’s ‘beautiful soul’, arguing that the self, to be viable, cannot remain encapsulated in inner subjectivity but must rather engage in emotion-laden confrontation with self-willed others in the social world; this requires a positive kind of alienation of the self from itself. Romantic effort to keep the self in itself as protection from the corrupted and corrupting social world was misguided. Hegel was right in asserting that the self is necessarily both subjective and objective, both inner and outer, but wrong in his contention that the self can progress by resolving inner contradictions, for the self, as the core of our personality, rather progresses through incorporating and elaborating contradictions, ambiguities, and polysemantic meanings.

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“…Francis Bragge writes that passions are the tendency of our souls towards both good and evil (Bragge 1708, 1) and Samuel Clarke refers to both affections and passions positively and negatively. The affections, in Christian thought, were seen in the light of the nature and revelation of God; writers such as Francis Hutcheson and Joseph Butler corroborate this view, that "the normative authority of our moral sentiments ultimately derives from the fact that they were built into our nature by God for the achievement of his intended ends" (Frazer 2010, English Literature, 5, 2018 e-ISSN 2420-823X ISSN 2385-1635 16). Dixon has observed that the most significant contributors to this field were all members of the clergy (1999,301); though the texts dealt with matters of theology, morality, and philosophy, they did so from a practical, rather than theoretical perspective, continuing the tradition established by the Puritans.…”

Section: Passions and Affectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

5 | 2018

2018

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This essay begins by asking why the term 'cross-cultural adaptation' should not be extended from adaptations that cross national borders to adaptations that cross temporal, historical, linguistic, medial, and gendered borders. Unlike some theorists who have attempted to define away the problems that arise when the term 'cross-cultural adaptation' is extended so broadly that it courts ambiguity, circularity, and redundancy by referring instead to 'transnational adaptation', the essay takes those problems as its subject. It suggests that adaptations police and valorize the cultural borders they cross by performing them as borders and the cultures they demarcate as cultures. Since cultures and the borders between them cannot be described without performing them, the essay concludes that the term 'cross-cultural adaptation' is as defensible as any other for describing-that is, for performing-the cultural work that adaptations do.

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The Enlightenment of Sympathy

Cited by 155 publications

References 0 publications

Hume’s Dynamic Coordination and International Law

Hume’s Dynamic Coordination and International Law

Alienation and Emotion: Hegel Versus Sentimentalism and Romanticism

5 | 2018

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