The Enemy of the Good: Supererogation and Requiring Perfection

Abstract

Moral theories that demand that we do what is morally best leave no room for the supererogatory. One argument against such theories is that they fail to realize the value of autonomy: supererogatory acts allow for the exercise of autonomy because their omissions are not accompanied by any threats of sanctions, unlike obligatory ones. While this argument fails, I use the distinction it draws – between omissions of obligatory and supererogatory acts in terms of appropriate sanctions – to draw a parallel with psychological perfectionism. Through this parallel, I demonstrate that requiring what is morally best is in fact counter-productive. Thus, by its own lights, a theory that wants us to do what is best ought at the very least to tell us to believe that some actions are supererogatory. As the old adage goes, the best is the enemy of the good; I argue here that the supererogatory is the solution.

What’s the Use of Non-moral Supererogation?

“…People would achieve more if they demanded less from themselves. As the saying goes, the perfect can often be "the enemy of the good" (Benn 2018).…”

Exploring and Expanding Supererogatory Acts: Beyond Duty for a Sustainable Future

“…As Archer ( 2013 ) and Benn ( 2019 ) insist, it is the ‘intention’ to perform the act (for example, to save someone from drowning) rather than the ‘motivation’ (for example, to attract publicity) that is important. If an act is performed to obviate negative repercussions, or is performed for personal glory, then that act could not be considered supererogatory even if the act itself was meritorious (Benn, 2018 ; Horgan & Timmons, 2010 ). Whether the performance of a supererogatory or otherwise virtuous act is indicative of the moral compass of the performing individual remains a moot point (Archer & Ridge, 2015 ; Archer, 2016a , b ; Levy, 2015 ).…”

Must we be perfect?: A case against supererogation

“…Supererogatory acts are often understood as being morally praiseworthy acts that are optional. Benn (2018a) writes, Like morally required actions, supererogatory actions are not forbidden and are thus permissible; unlike morally required acts, they are also 'beyond duty'. As such, supererogatory actions are 'optional' in the sense that they are neither morally forbidden nor morally required.…”

“…Susan Wolf famously raises a similar critique in 'Moral Saints', arguing that the lives of 'moral saints'-which she defines as people whose every act is as morally good as possible (p. 419)neglect other goods and values in the attaining of solely moral perfection. Benn (2015) argues that the demandingness of perfection takes the form of a constraint on the autonomy of the agent, shrinking her set of permissible actions down to a small pool. She coins the 'Confinement Objection', which holds that a moral theory is implausibly demanding if it constrains the set of actions available to us in such a way.…”