The End of the Timeless God

Mullins, R. T.

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755180.001.0001

Cited by 71 publications

(14 citation statements)

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“…omnipotent), knowing all things, perfectly good, a source of moral obligation, immutable, eternal, a necessary being, holy, and worthy of worship' [17,2]. As an indicator of how distant the current mainstream is from apophaticism, both constructively and interpretatively, see Ryan Mullins' stark claim that no historic Christian thinker believes in divine ineffability [12,7]; I respond to the kind of inconsistency charge made there in [8,Ch. 2].…”

Section: Stump's Aquinasmentioning

confidence: 99%

Disowning the Mystery: Stump's Non-Apophatic Aquinas

Hewitt

2020

Medieval Mystical Theology

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Section: Stump's Aquinasmentioning

confidence: 99%

Disowning the Mystery: Stump's Non-Apophatic Aquinas

Hewitt

2020

Medieval Mystical Theology

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“…It also allows panentheists to continue to disagree over the modal status of the universe. It is not clear to me how the panentheist can use this to justify her claim that her model of God is 82 For more on the distinction between metaphysical and physical space and time see (Mullins, 2016). 83 (Hudson, 2005) (Hudson, 2014).…”

Section: Another Attempt At Demarcating Panentheismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Difficulty with Demarcating Panentheism

Mullins

2016

SOPHIA

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In certain theological circles today, panentheism is all the rage. One of the most notorious difficulties with panentheism lies in figuring out what panentheism actually is. There have been several attempts in recent literature to demarcate panentheism from classical theism, neo-classical theism, open theism, and pantheism. I shall argue that these attempts to demarcate panentheism from these other positions fail. Then I shall offer my own demarcation.

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“…1 Elswhere, Craig, and his sometimes co-author James Sinclair, have argued that contemporary physical cosmology strongly supports the conclusion that the universe began to exist at a finite time in the past (Craig 1979(Craig , 1992(Craig , 1993b(Craig , 1993a(Craig , 2009(Craig , 2012(Craig , 2016. Moreover, they have argued that beginning to exist -in their sense of the phrase -is an irreducibly tensed notion, so that the universe could have begun to exist only if the Atheory of time -that is, the view that there are objectively and irreducibly tensed facts -is true (Craig & Sinclair, 2009, 183-184, 2007, 1990; this conclusion is shared by many other philosophers and theologians, including William Godfrey-Smith (1977), Bradley Monton (2009), David Oderberg (2003), Ryan Mullins (2016;, and Felipe Leon (2019). Other authors, e.g., Reichenbach, (1971, 11), hold that B-theory entails that nothing objectively begins or changes and so are implicitly committed to a view close to Craig and Sinclair's.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Neo-Lorentzian relativity and the beginning of the universe

Linford¹

2021

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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Many physicists have thought that absolute time became otiose with the introduction of Special Relativity. William Lane Craig disagrees. Craig argues that although relativity is empirically adequate within a domain of application, relativity is literally false and should be supplanted by a Neo-Lorentzian alternative that allows for absolute time. Meanwhile, Craig and co-author James Sinclair have argued that physical cosmology supports the conclusion that physical reality began to exist at a finite time in the past. However, on their view, the beginning of physical reality requires the objective passage of absolute time, so that the beginning of physical reality stands or falls with Craig's Neo-Lorentzian metaphysics. Here, I raise doubts about whether, given Craig's Neo-Lorentzian metaphysics, physical cosmology could adequately support a beginning of physical reality within the finite past. Craig and Sinclair's conception of the beginning of the universe requires a past boundary to the universe. A past boundary to the universe cannot be directly observed and so must be inferred from the observed matter-energy distribution in conjunction with auxilary hypotheses drawn from a substantive physical theory. Craig's brand of Neo-Lorentzian has not been sufficiently well specified so as to infer either that there is a past boundary or that the boundary is located in the finite past. Consequently, Neo-Lorentzian implicitly introduces a form of skepticism that removes the ability that we might have otherwise had to infer a beginning of the universe. Furthermore, in analyzing traditional big bang models, I develop criteria that Neo-Lorentzians should deploy in thinking about the direction and duration of time in cosmological models generally. For my last task, I apply the same criteria to bounce cosmologies and show that Craig and Sinclair have been wrong to interpret bounce cosmologies as including a beginning of physical reality. Keywords TimeThis paper is dedicated to my father, Paul Linford, who unfortunately passed away when this paper was accepted for publication. I love you, dad.

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The End of the Timeless God

Cited by 71 publications

References 0 publications

Disowning the Mystery: Stump's Non-Apophatic Aquinas

Disowning the Mystery: Stump's Non-Apophatic Aquinas

The Difficulty with Demarcating Panentheism

Neo-Lorentzian relativity and the beginning of the universe

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