The End of Secularisation through Demography? Projections of Spanish Religiosity

Stonawski, Marcin; Skirbekk, Vegard; Kaufmann, Eric P.; Goujon, Anne

doi:10.1080/13537903.2015.986972

Cited by 17 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 63 publications

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“…This requirement, that the share of middle religiosity people is larger than the seculars and the very religious, is rather trivially satisfied at the current state of secularization in almost all populations. Particularly, the empirical evidence is congruent with the assumption that the shares of both the very religious and the strictly secular are relatively small, compared with the individuals with average religiosity (Dilmaghani, 2017; Kaufmann et al, 2012; Stonawski et al, 2015). Consequently, if the researcher relies on this index to assess the degree of religious polarization over time in a given population, the changes in the value of this index produces an accurate metric.…”

Section: Methodssupporting

confidence: 67%

Measuring religious polarization: Application with American and Canadian data

Dilmaghani

2020

Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses

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Numerous studies suggest that polarization best describes the religious landscape of a growing number of Western countries. While a consensus is gradually emerging regarding the definition of religious polarization, no quantitative measure has been proposed to capture the concept. The present research note proposes two indices for the concept of religious polarization so that its degree can be compared across populations and its evolution can be traced over time. The proposed approach is applied to the US data of 2008–2016 and the Canadian data of 2008–2015. The relative ranking of the degree of polarization emerging from the computation of these indices accords with the previous literature, which has relied on the interpretation of distinct trends. These applications demonstrate the aptness of these indices for measuring religious polarization, as defined in the recent religious scholarship.

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Section: Methodssupporting

confidence: 67%

Measuring religious polarization: Application with American and Canadian data

Dilmaghani

2020

Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses

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“…However, if fertility rates for both Muslims and Christians were to converge and decline, this would imply a lower population growth in the coming decades. We study the possible consequences of different fertility trajectories on religious composition in Nigeria using a demographic projection model that takes into account differences in fertility, intergenerational transmissions of religion and age-distribution of religious beliefs (Goujon et al 2013; Hackett et al 2015a; Stonawski et al 2015).…”

Section: Population Projectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The changing religious composition of Nigeria: causes and implications of demographic divergence

et al. 2016

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At nearly 170 million inhabitants, Nigeria is Africa's most populous country by twofold and fertility levels remain higher than most other sub-Saharan African nations. Throughout the last several decades, the fertility gap between Christians and Muslims has widened with significant political implications for a nascent democracy. Where the Demographic Health Survey (DHS) survey of 1990 revealed a non-significant difference of 0·3 children, this figure had increased to 2·3 children by 2013. As the total fertility rate (TFR) of Christians decreased significantly from 6·1 to 4·5 children per woman between 1990 and 2013, the TFR of Muslims increased from 6·4 to 6·8 children per woman. The timing of this divergence coincides with the formal institutionalization of Sharia law in 1999. We examine the role of religion on education, contraception and family behaviour. Finally, we touch upon the implications for population growth and the religious composition of Nigeria in the coming decades.

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“…The rapid growth in the Muslim population would suggest that this group has become the second largest religious community in Spain after Christianspredominately Roman Catholic (e.g. Stonawski et al, 2015).…”

Section: Spainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fertility Patterns of Native and Migrant Muslims in Europe

2015

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This study focuses on Muslim fertility in Europe. Evidence from 25 countries suggests that the Muslim total fertility rate is on average 47% higher than the national level. However, we find a significant difference in the level of fertility of native-born Muslims and immigrant Muslims. The native-born have a 19% higher total fertility rate, while immigrants have 62% higher fertility. Our main research question is whether religion is an important determinant of fertility outcome, or whether the other characteristics that are specific for Muslims in Europe (e.g. socio-economics, migrant status, and religiosity) determine the observed difference in fertility. To answer this question, we focus on three case studies: Spain, where most Muslims are immigrants; Bulgaria, where most Muslims are native; and Greece, which has significant shares of both recent migrants and native Muslims. Our findings suggest that the immigrant status of Muslims and their socio-economic status are more important than religion in terms of explaining their high fertility.

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The End of Secularisation through Demography? Projections of Spanish Religiosity

Cited by 17 publications

References 63 publications

Measuring religious polarization: Application with American and Canadian data

Measuring religious polarization: Application with American and Canadian data

The changing religious composition of Nigeria: causes and implications of demographic divergence

Fertility Patterns of Native and Migrant Muslims in Europe

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