The EMU Debt Crisis: Early Lessons and Reforms*

Buti, Marco; Carnot, Nicolas

doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.2012.02288.x

Cited by 93 publications

(72 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…In addition, we need to take into account that the motivations to engage in the scrutiny of EU affairs may also be affected by the distinct macro-economic conditions that parliaments faced in the 2010-2012 period (see among others Buti and Carnot 2012;De Grauwe and Ji 2012).…”

Section: Incentives For Scrutiny Ii: Macro-economic Conditionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

National Parliaments and the Eurozone Crisis: Taking Ownership in Difficult Times?

Auel¹,

Höing²

2015

West European Politics

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The eurozone crisis suggests a significant reinforcement of the executive dominance in EU policy-making. Opaque emergency decisions taken at European summits as well as treaties established outside of the EU legal framework facilitate the side-lining of democratically elected chambers. This development entails the risk of a new wave of deparliamentarisation in EU policy-making. An effective scrutiny of the crisis management by national parliaments is, however, indispensable to take national ownership of the reforms in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This paper therefore investigates national parliaments' involvement in the development of instruments to combat the crisis. Based on a quantitative data set of crisis-related parliamentary activities in 2010-2012, we observe a very uneven engagement in the scrutiny of the crisis management. Institutional prerogatives in EU affairs as well as macro-economic factors can partly explain the observed variation. Surprisingly, however, crisis-related parliamentary activity is not a reaction to Eurosceptic attitudes either in parliament or the public.

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Section: Incentives For Scrutiny Ii: Macro-economic Conditionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

National Parliaments and the Eurozone Crisis: Taking Ownership in Difficult Times?

Auel¹,

Höing²

2015

West European Politics

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“…Notably, especially during the first phase of the fiscal crisis, the European Council and the Eurogroup acted outside EU procedures. In the macroeconomic imbalances procedure, for instance, the Commission assumes a strong role in monitoring and coordinating, but formal sanctions can only be issued by the European Council (Buti and Carnot, 2012). The Banking Union, in contrast, has marked the most expansive treaty change since the Treaty of Maastricht.…”

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confidence: 99%

Accountability in the post-Lisbon European Union

Brandsma

Heidbreder

Mastenbroek

2016

International Review of Administrative Sciences

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This special issue takes stock of recent post-Lisbon additions to the European Union's accountability toolkit. It provides indications that older decision-making tools tend to be more accountable than newer ones, and that, in some areas, decision-making is shifting towards less accountable arenas. This introductory article reviews the debate on the gradual evolution of the European Union's accountability system and introduces key aspects of the post-Lisbon era that can be expected to affect accountability in the European Union, and that have been overlooked by the literature thus far: delegated acts, economic governance and regulatory evaluations. The contributions to this special issue address each of these domains in detail and highlight the degree to which accountability has been enhanced. A final contribution shows how these arrangements fit into the wider landscape of already-existing European Union accountabilities and how this landscape has developed over time. Points for practitionersThere is an apparent link between the relative novelty of the institutional setting in which a governance system is embedded and its accountability. Settings that include a strong role for the European Commission tend to be the most accountable ones, while those that rely mostly on intergovernmental logics, including those that have been created outside the Treaty framework, come with significant gaps.

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“…Under the pressure of the markets and in a classic trial-and-error dynamics, the instruments within the toolkit of the ECB have been enlarged allowing for a relaxation of the commitment to stable inflation in favour of a sort of discretion conceded to the central bankers (Buti and Carnot 2012).…”

Section: Contingent Learning and Integration Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Crisis, learning and policy change in the European Union

Kamkhaji

Radaelli

2016

Journal of European Public Policy

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What is the causal relationship between crisis, learning and change? How does causality works in the current responses to the sovereign debt crisis provided by the European Union? We question the conventional identification of the cause-and-effect relationship provided by theories of crisis management, integration and policy learning. Drawing on models of contingent learning developed within psychology and behavioural and evolutionary economics, we theorise that surprise produces behavioural change via a fast-paced associative cue-outcome mechanism and that policy learning follows change. We then run our exercise in causal identification through a plausibility probe. We show that our argument passes the plausibility probe. Our conclusions on cognition and situational effects on learning suggest a new research agenda, more sensitive to how individuals behave in the real world and more robust in its micro-foundations.

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The EMU Debt Crisis: Early Lessons and Reforms*

Cited by 93 publications

References 6 publications

National Parliaments and the Eurozone Crisis: Taking Ownership in Difficult Times?

National Parliaments and the Eurozone Crisis: Taking Ownership in Difficult Times?

Accountability in the post-Lisbon European Union

Crisis, learning and policy change in the European Union

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