The emergence of categorical norms

Abstract

Why are norms unduly sensitive to categorical distinctions compared to continuous variation? For instance, the norm against the use of chemical weapons considers the type of weapon used, not how much suffering was caused; human rights are conditioned on membership in the species homo spaiens not on an animal's degree of sentience; norms promoting philanthropy emphasize donating, and are relatively insensitive to the impact a donation will have. Here we present a game theoretic model, which explains why it is easier for norms to be conditioned on categorical distinctions rather than on continuous variation. We explore the robustness of our results and present evolutionary simulations. Then, in a series of experiments, we demonstrate that participants’ moral intuitions and willingness to sanction norm violations are influenced by categorical distinctions rather than by continuous variation. We show that the reliance on categorical distinctions weakens when norm enforcement plays less of a role. We discuss various applications, including territoriality, human rights, inefficient altruism, institutionalized racism, and collusion.

A Computational Account of the Normative Concerns Guiding Context-dependent Prosocial Behavior

“…We found that the framing of actions (active versus passive harm) mainly influenced judgments, whereas selfish actions were less framing-sensitive and depended on the varying choice outcomes instead. This refines theoretical proposals that coordination on what constitutes a norm transgression relies on categorical distinctions between the general nature of actions, rather than continuous outcomes considerations (23). Our analysis shows that although normative judgments may be considered categorical, actions are often more nuanced and depend on decision stakes.…”

“…Our results additionally contribute to the debates on the nature of social preferences, and in particular the importance of contexts (23), outcome-based preferences (24,25), and unconditional moral preferences (79). By using a combination of varying outcome ranges and utility models, we could capture the effects of different motives at the individual level within the same framework.…”

“…To account for the diversity of possible normative concerns, we reviewed the literature and identified four distinct motives that have been proposed to underlie prosocial versus selfish behavior. First, individuals may show unconditional preferences for prosocial actions, which are independent of the specific choice outcomes (22,23) or contexts. Second, they may show outcome-based preferences and act or judge actions differently depending on the stakes (costs and consequences) of the decisions (24)(25)(26)(27)(28).…”