The Embedded Epistemologist: Dispatches from the Legal Front*

Abstract

In ordinary circumstances, we can assess the worth of evidence well enough without benefit of any theory; but when evidence is especially complex, ambiguous, or emotionally disturbing—as it often is in legal contexts—epistemological theory may be helpful. A legal fact‐finder is asked to determine whether the proposition that the defendant is guilty, or is liable, is established to the required degree of proof by the [admissible] evidence presented; i.e., to make an epistemological appraisal. The foundherentist theory developed in Evidence and Inquiry can help us understand what this means; and reveals that degrees of proof cannot be construed as mathematical probabilities: a point illustrated by comparing the advantages of a foundherentist analysis with the disadvantages of probabilistic analyses of the evidence in the Sacco and Vanzetti case (1921), and of the role of the statistical evidence in Collins (1968).

To catch a thief with and without numbers: arguments, scenarios and probabilities in evidential reasoning

“…However, since our approach is probabilistic, the strength of presumptive arguments changes with their direction (in accordance with Bayes' rule). Another anti-probabilistic approach is Haack's (2012) foundherentist approach in which a balance is struck between coherentist and foundationalist epistemology. Pardo and Allen propose an inference to the best explanation approach, in which explanations play a role similar to scenarios (Pardo and Allen, 2008).…”

La Fragmentación de la Filosofía, El camino de la reintegración

“…en el campo de la epistemología de la virtud, aquellos que siguen la dirección de Ernest Sosa 60 y los que siguen la de Linda Zagzebski. 61 La mayoría de estos epistemólogos-académicos parecen en gran parte indiferentes a los campos vecinos; de todos modos, mis esfuerzos por interesarlos en cuestiones acerca de los procedimientos de prueba en el derecho, 62 o en lo que podemos aprender de las novelas epistemológicas como The Way of All Flesh de Samuel Butler 63 (una representación brillante del auto-engaño, la hipocresía, y el razonamiento falso) o Gaudy Night 64 de Dorothy Sayers (una exploración iluminadora del lugar de las mujeres en la vida mental), o en las observaciones acerca de los "desconocidos desconocidos" en la inteligencia militar de las que tanto se burló el ex Secretario de Estado Donald Rumsfeld, 65 o en qué consiste creer algo, 66 o,…, etc., parecen hablar a oídos sordos. Aparentemente ni aquellos epistemólogos académicos tienen demasiado interés en la historia de su campo; de todos modos, he asistido a muchas conferencias sobre epistemología sin escuchar una palabra acerca de algo escrito hace más de 10 años.…”

Explaining the Justificatory Asymmetry between Statistical and Individualized Evidence

“…Risinger (2004Risinger ( , 2018's 'surprise' theory, on which e is good evidence for p if, given e, we would be surprised to learn that p is false, can be read as a variant of the normic support model as well. Haack (2012) (as well as Brennan-Marquez (2017) and others) suggest that evidential strength amounts to explanatory power and coherence, whereas statistical generalizations typically speak to probabilities without explaining why they should hold, and so are relatively weak evidence. thinking, driven by "a moral yearning for perfectly equitable and just evidence and inference"-but wishing can't make it so.…”