The EM Side—Channel(s)

Agrawal, Dakshi; Archambeault, Bruce; Rao, Josyula R.; Rohatgi, Pankaj

doi:10.1007/3-540-36400-5_4

Cited by 506 publications

(370 citation statements)

References 7 publications

(34 reference statements)

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“…This is the basic idea behind power analysis, and differential power analysis [8] in particular. In addition to power consumption, other side channels have been considered, including timing [11] and electromagnetic radiation (EM) [7,14,3].…”

Section: Power Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

On Second-Order Differential Power Analysis

Joye

Paillier

Schoenmakers

2005

Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems – CHES 2005

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Abstract. Differential Power Analysis (DPA) is a powerful cryptanalytic technique aiming at extracting secret data from a cryptographic device by collecting power consumption traces and averaging over a series of acquisitions. In order to prevent the leakage, hardware designers and software programmers make use of masking techniques (a.k.a. data whitening methods). However, the resulting implementations may still succumb to second-order DPA. Several recent papers studied secondorder DPA but, although the conclusions that are drawn are correct, the analysis is not. This paper fills the gap by providing an exact analysis of secondorder DPA as introduced by Messerges. It also considers several generalizations, including an extended analysis in the more general Hammingdistance model.

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Section: Power Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

On Second-Order Differential Power Analysis

Joye

Paillier

Schoenmakers

2005

Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems – CHES 2005

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“…EM emissions can be generally categorised into two types: direct emissions and modulated emissions [4]. Direct emissions are caused directly by current flow with sharp rising/falling edges.…”

Section: Simulation Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They are divided into those detecting electric and those detecting magnetic fields in near-field 4 , or those detecting far-field EM-field. In EM analysis attacks on small devices with weak EM emissions such as a smart card, nearfield sensors are more appropriate.…”

Section: Em Field Measurement Equipmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security Evaluation Against Electromagnetic Analysis at Design Time

Markettos

Moore

2005

Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems – CHES 2005

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Abstract. Electromagnetic analysis (EMA) can be used to compromise secret information by analysing the electric and/or magnetic fields emanating from a device. It follows differential power analysis (DPA) becoming an important side channel cryptanalysis attack on many cryptographic implementations, so that constitutes a real threat to smart card security. A systematic simulation methodology is proposed to identify and assess electromagnetic (EM) leakage characteristics of secure processors at design time. This EM simulation methodology involves current flow simulation, chip layout parasitics extraction, then data processing to simulate direct EM emissions or modulated emissions. Tests implemented on synchronous and asynchronous processors indicates that the synchronous processor has data dependent EM emission, while the asynchronous processor has data dependent timing which is visible in differential EM analysis (DEMA). In particular, DEMA of amplitude demodulated emissions reveals greater leakage compared to DEMA of direct emissions and DPA. The proposed simulation methodology can be easily employed in the framework of an integrated circuit (IC) design flow to perform a systematic EM characteristics analysis.

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“…Side channel attacks aim at disclosing the secret key of cryptographic primitives, through measuring environmental parameters during their computation. Typical environmental parameters from which it is possible to extract information relative to the values being processed are: power consumption [6,10], electromagnetic radiation [1,9] and execution timing [5]. Depending on the environmental parameter being measured, the attack techniques are called respectively Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA), Differential Power Analysis (DPA) and Timing analysis (TA).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information Leakage Discovery Techniques to Enhance Secure Chip Design

Barenghi

Pelosi

Téglia

2011

Information Security Theory and Practice. Security and Privacy of Mobile Devices in Wireless Communication

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Abstract. Side channel attacks analyzing both power consumption and electromagnetic (EM) radiations are a well known threat to the security of devices dealing with sensitive data. Whilst it is well known that the EM emissions of a chip represent an information leakage stronger than the overall dynamic power consumption, the actual relation between the emissions and the computations is still a subject under exploration. It is important for the chip designer to be able to distinguish which portions of the measured EM emissions are actually correlated with the sensitive information. Our technique obtains a detailed profile of the information leakage, identifying which harmonic components carry the largest part of the it on the measured signals. It may be successfully integrated in a design workflow as a post-testing feedback from the prototype chip, in the form of additional constraints aimed at reducing the local wires congestion up to a point where the emissions are no longer sufficient to conduct an attack. The analysis allows the design of ad-hoc countermeasures (shields and/or EM jammers), which do not require architectural changes to the chip. We provide a validation of the proposed technique on a commercial grade ARM Cortex-M3 based System on Chip (SoC), executing a software implementation of AES-128. The proposed approach is more efficient than a search of the whole frequency spectrum, allowing to conduct a deeper analysis with the same timing constraints.

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The EM Side—Channel(s)

Cited by 506 publications

References 7 publications

On Second-Order Differential Power Analysis

On Second-Order Differential Power Analysis

Security Evaluation Against Electromagnetic Analysis at Design Time

Information Leakage Discovery Techniques to Enhance Secure Chip Design

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